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The point of departure for this thesis is Michael Power’s provocative proposition in his 1997 book 
The Audit Society (Power, 1997). There he states that auditing produces only reassurance. This thesis 
is an empirical investigation into the influence of the Norwegian Supreme Audit Institution to see if 
this assertion is true.  
 
The Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) can be described as a tool of the parliament for use in 
exercising control over the government administration. In this thesis, I concentrate on one particular 
method of the SAI, namely “performance auditing”. Performance auditing is similar to evaluation 
but is conducted within the context of institutional control. This method has become increasingly 
important with the advent of new management principles and techniques in the public sector from 
the 1980s onwards. The new public management (NPM) system was partly inspired by management 
techniques in the private sector and is focused on the efficient and effective use of resources. Interest 
in the performance of public entities, however, predates NPM by many decades. 
 
Accountability mechanisms are needed to prevent misuse of power. For this reason, the role of 
external control institutions is rarely questioned. Some scholars nevertheless accuse such institutions 
of providing assessments that are too detailed and narrow. At the same time, others describe how 
SAIs are at risk of becoming political and running into conflicts with the executive.  
 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate how auditees and members of the parliament (MPs) respond 
to performance auditing. It is their reactions and opinions that are the dependent variable. In this 
thesis, a mixed-method approach – including a questionnaire for auditees, interviews and document 
analysis – was adopted.  
 
Contrary to Power’s assertions, my study shows that performance auditing does have an impact. A 
majority of civil servants find performance auditing helpful. Their perception of its usefulness 
depends on the extent to which their comments were taken into account in the performance auditing 
process, whether they considered the performance audit report to be of high quality, whether the 







There are nevertheless differences in how respondents perceive performance audit reports. In 
general, civil servants at ministries and top executives tend to be more negative. This suggests that 
the offices that are responsible find it uncomfortable to be held to account.  
 
Civil servants more exposed to performance auditing are more negative too. This may indicate 
control overload. Alternatively, it may indicate discomfort linked to justified control. 
 
In one-third of cases, the performance audit is used to hold a minister to account. This tendency 
increases when the media or other actors take an interest in the report. Pressure from political 
opponents and demands for concrete measures from the parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs (control committee) strengthen this tendency in equal measure.  
 
Auditees use different strategies when they are subject to performance auditing. Their willingness to 
make changes depends on pressure from and sanctions imposed by the parliamentary control 
committee, as well as on their own perception of the report. If they disagree with the report’s 
findings and sanctions are weak, they will resist change. If they agree with the findings and sanctions 
are tough, they will implement change. At the same time, apparent indifference towards the report 
does not necessarily mean less impact. When the findings of a report are important, the ministries 
will use them to make improvements, regardless of whether the report triggers debate.  
 
Performance audit reports have a moderate impact on the public debate.  Thus the SAI’s direct 
dialogue with the ministries is important. At the same time, disagreements based on different values 
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1. Introduction  
 
Michael Power (1997) described the development towards an audit society as continuing 
institutional pressure for auditability. Auditors’ control systems are set up to secure “cost-
effectiveness”. It is assumed that this checking is effective and has an impact. Power casts 
doubt on this assumption and argues that these audits and inspections provide only comfort 
and reassurance. His assertion is a comment on the organization of trust in developed 
societies and the related institutionalization.  
 
In line with Power’s arguments, it has recently been suggested as part of the public debate 
in Norway that all this control activity increases both administration costs and bureaucracy 
without contributing to any improvement in the audited entities (Kinander, 2012a). A 
counterargument is that control does contribute to learning and improvement and enhances 
accountability (Lonsdale, Wilkins, & Ling, 2011). It is therefore both interesting and 
important to empirically investigate how, for whom and to what extent these audits may 
have an impact. This thesis explores the influence of performance audits on civil servants 





















1.1 Research questions 
The subject of investigation of this study is whether democratic accountability can be 
achieved through performance auditing. I pose four sets of research questions to examine this 
proposition. Each set of questions is tackled in one of the four articles that constitute the main 
part of this thesis. 
 
1. What is the performance audit’s message? How important is this message for public 
debates and what are the implications of such debates for the  influence of the SAI? 
2. To what extent are performance audits perceived as helpful by the auditees? To what 
extent are audits used to hold ministers to account and how can observed patterns be 
explained? 
3. What mechanisms are triggered in the audited entities when the SAI holds them to 
account and why are these mechanisms triggered?     
4. How do audited civil servants at ministries and government agencies view the SAI’s 




Whether the audited entities improve depends not only on the efforts of the audit institutions 
but also on the audited entities themselves and the overall environment in which they operate. 
The performance audit can be seen at best as a point of departure for a learning process 
(Argyris, 1999; De Vries, Van der Meer, & Vissers, 2000). Some organizations may have a 
culture of learning, while others are more indifferent or more sceptical. This thesis does not 
explore this aspect in depth as I have not collected enough data to make a judgment on the 
audited entities’ readiness to learn and make changes.  My research agenda is to scrutinize the 
ability of the audit institutions to influence the audited entities without problematizing that 
entity’s culture. To explore the impact of control on learning and innovation is nevertheless an 
interesting topic for future research. 
 
In Norway, the SAI is mandated by law (Law No. 21 “On the Office of the Auditor General 
of Norway”,2004) to look for irregularities and corruption – a task that might demand police-
like investigation methods. This mandate plays an important role in securing public funds. 
Many audit institutions nevertheless find it difficult to carry out this task because within an 
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audit context, detecting corruption is quite unique and requires special methods. I will not 
elaborate on this issue in my thesis.  
 
Performance audits at the national and local level have much in common, but there are also 
many structural and institutional differences. The political, administrative and organizational 
conditions vary somewhat between audits at these two levels. Audits at the municipal level 
may be put up for tender. Local audit institutions do not interact with international peers to the 
same extent as do SAIs. The audit process is organized differently at the local level and the 
audit offices are smaller and more decentralized.  Moreover, local audit offices’ experience of 
performance auditing, which is a relatively recent activity, varies too. This may have 
implications for the competence of the audit offices, their choice of strategy and their relations 
with the audited entities (Meld. St. 12 (2011-2012), 2012).  Performance auditing conducted 
at the local level is therefore not covered in this thesis. The impact of the self-monitoring of 
and control over the municipalities is an under-researched but important topic.  
 
In this thesis, I investigate how auditors exert influence, but I do not examine the preventive 
effect of conducting audits in the same policy area one or more times in succession or the 
effect of follow-up activities. The ever-present threat of being called to account is just as 
important as the act of bringing officials to account. It is probable that the expectation of 
follow-up by a SAI or continued monitoring will also have an effect on the auditees. For 
example, the auditees might anticipate reactions and take precautions to avoid criticism 
(Mulgan, 2000). This topic is not explored fully in this thesis. Rather, the primary focus is on 
single reports and their impact. The preventive effect of control should be explored in further 
research as it could have implications for innovation in the public sector. 
 
2. Key concepts  
Three concepts central to this thesis are discussed below.  
 
The first concept is “performance auditing”, in other words assessing that which the 
government administration is held to account for (Bovens, 2007a). What the content of a 
performance audit is or should be is a complex question that has been widely discussed 




In this thesis, the second concept, “control”, is used primarily in relation to the principal-agent 
perspective of  democratic government, where elected politicians in the parliament evaluate 
the government’s use of the taxpayer’s money on behalf of the principal (that is, the people) 
(Strøm, 2000).  
 
The last concept, “accountability”, relates to the principal’s act of holding agents to account. 
Ideally, the parliament uses the SAI’s performance audit reports to hold the government 
administration to account for its actions. In addition, there are other accountability 
relationships involving voters, the media and subordinate entities (Bovens, 2007a). 
 
Figure 1 below illustrates how the government and its administration perform tasks to 
produce certain societal outcomes. Both are accountable to the parliament for their use of 
the taxpayer’s money. The SAI assesses the government administration’s work and reports 
back to the parliament. As an independent institution, the SAI uses performance audits not 
only to hold the ministries to account but also to enhance the government administration’s 
ability to work efficiently and effectively.  
 
The SAI’s control is diagonal because it is the parliament that sanctions the ministers and the 
SAI’s role is limited to drawing up the reports. The parliament acts on behalf of the voters and 
controls the use of the taxpayer’s money. Ministers answer only to the parliament, while 




Figure 1: Accountability relationships involving the SAI 
The relationships between the SAI, the parliament and the audited entities are discussed in the 
four articles that constitute the main part of this thesis. The first article investigates to what 
extent the reports are publicly debated and what implications this might have for the SAI’s 
influence. It also explores the content of the SAI’s performance audit (the first set of research 
questions). The parliament, the government and the SAI are all subject to media scrutiny and 
socially accountable to the media. The ministries are held to account diagonally in the 
performance audit reports and politically in the parliament (hierarchical accountability). 
 
The second article of this thesis investigates when and to what extent the reports are used to 
hold ministers to account. Both the parliament and the SAI are forums to which the auditees 
have to explain themselves. The parliament may impose formal and informal sanctions on the 
government and its ministers that may entail consequences if the government and its minsters 
do not live up to expectations as regards their  performance and compliance (Bovens, 2007a) 
(the second set of research questions).  
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In exercising its control, the SAI points to deficiencies in performance and compliance that 
audited entities are expected to rectify (Pollitt et al., 1999). The intention is that this will lead 
to improvements. The second and third articles of this thesis investigate how auditees respond 
to performance audits, whether and when they find them helpful (the second set of research 
questions) and what strategies they use when exposed to performance auditing (the third set of 
research questions). The fourth article explains the differences in auditees’ perceptions of the 
quality of performance audit reports (the fourth set of research questions) – a factor that is 
important for how auditees view the usefulness of performance auditing.  
 
2.1. Performance auditing 
The aim of performance auditing is to evaluate a public entity’s performance by assessing its 
disposition and the results it has achieved. Performance auditing is not limited, as is financial 
auditing, to examining whether a public entity has given an accurate account of its financial 
transactions. Rather, it is an examination made on a non-recurring basis that controls selected 
issues at a given point in time. It can therefore be characterized as a “fire alarm” rather than a 
“police patrol” (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). Performance auditing resembles evaluation 
but is placed in an institutional context of accountability (Hood, 1995; Lægreid, Roness, & 
Rubecksen, 2006; Nordby, 2004). The subject of the SAI performance audit is selected based 
on the principle of added value and the risk and materiality of potential problems (INTOSAI, 
2013b).  Below I elaborate on the content of the performance audit and the differing 
perceptions of it. 
 
The mandate of the performance audit 
Performance auditing is defined by the International Organisation of Supreme Audit 
Institutions (INTOSAI) as “an independent, objective and reliable examination of whether 
government undertakings, systems, operations, programmes, activities or organisations are 
operating in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness and 
whether there is room for improvement” (INTOSAI, 2013a, p 2). The audit may take a 
result-oriented approach, which assesses whether pre-defined objectives have been achieved 
as intended; a problem-oriented approach, which verifies and analyses the causes of a 
particular problem(s); a system-oriented approach, which examines the proper functioning 





Not all SAIs are allowed to assess operations. In several countries, there have been disputes 
over the mandate of the performance audit, specifically whether effectiveness – which implies 
that the SAI can also assess if the government has succeeded in obtaining its stated goals – 
should be included in the mandate. This has led to clashes between SAIs and national and 
local governments (Guthrie & Parker, 1999; Jacobs, 1998; Radcliffe, 1998). When the SAI 
evaluates effectiveness, it is at risk of being accused of interpreting the will of the parliament 
in a way that may suit someone or some group politically (Sejersted, 2002).  
 
The Norwegian SAI, like the Dutch SAI, is preoccupied with holding ministers to account for 
policy practices and evaluating the effectiveness of the public administration. Both the Dutch 
SAI and the National Audit Office of the United Kingdom (NAO) view goals and outputs as 
key aspects of their work (Pollitt & Mul, 1999).The NAO does not hold ministers to account 
for policy practices. Instead, it is the administrative relationship between the minister and the 
administration and the relationship between the administration and the citizen/customer that is 
evaluated (Arthur, Rydland, & Amundsen, 2012; Put, 2011). Canada and the United States are 
reluctant to evaluate the effectiveness of the government administration (US Government 
Accountability Office, 2011; Morin, 2003; Pollitt & Mul, 1999).  
 
The SAI’s audit criteria 
Auditing implies that a judgment must be made. Judgments require criteria against which 
facts can be assessed. Audit institutions often apply government instructions and guidelines as 
well as other standards to operationalize the will of the parliament (Pollitt & Mul, 1999). 
Accepted standards, norms and targets can be used; these could include regulations and 
guidelines, professional standards, performance objectives and targets, recognized 
management practices and contractual requirements. In Norway, a comprehensive model for 
performance management was introduced into the Government Financial Regulations of  
1996 (Lægreid et al., 2006). In its audit criteria, the SAI often uses these financial regulations 
to operationalize the Norwegian parliament’s decisions and initial legislative, policy and other 
proposals. 
 
In a report titled “Parliamentary Control over Government and Public Administration” 
(Stortinget, 2002-2003), the parliament emphasized that there is a distinction between the 
goals set by the parliament and those set by the government administration. The SAI is not an 
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auditing body for the government (NOAG, 2011). The aim of a performance audit is to 
establish whether the decisions and intentions of the parliament have been implemented.  
 
How the achievements of the audited entity are assessed depends on the SAI’s criteria and 
how it measures performance. There are differences in emphasis among SAIs. For example, 
one SAI may place more importance than others on the procedures in place, the competency 
of the entity, the measures of output and outcome or the costs relative to output (Dubnick, 
2005).  
 
In its audit criteria, the SAI has to operationalize the parliament’s decisions and intentions. In 
doing so, it exercises discretion. Setting criteria for judgment gives the SAI the power of 
definition and determines what assessments it makes. Questions can therefore be raised as to 
how this discretion is exercised and how the parliament is to treat the audit report – as a body 
of indisputable facts or as a basis for political judgment (Sejersted, 2002). In its comments to 
the reports, the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs will, in any case, 
signal what it wishes the administration to focus on (Nordby, 2004).  
 
What auditors evaluate 
The auditing profession has struggled to reconcile differences in beliefs and interpretations 
over what constitutes performance auditing (Funkhouser, 2011). There are different types of 
audit reports focusing on results, processes or compliance, and these reports  provide 
explanations about their findings to varying degrees (Grönlund, Svärdsten, & Öhman, 2011; 
Put, 2011). Different audit institutions perform different roles: some take on the role of 
“public accountant” or “judge” and are preoccupied with processes and compliance with the 
law and regulations; others act primarily as “researchers”, whose main concern is to discuss 
new information, or as “management consultants”, focused, above all, on giving advice and 
contributing to improvement. Which roles they play depends on institutional factors such as 
the audit institution’s culture and the competence of its auditors (Pollitt et al., 1999).  
 
The ideal focus in performance auditing is on performance with the aim of contributing to 
improvement. However, it is still the case that very few reports focus on efficiency and 
effectiveness. Rather, they are system-oriented towards matters of good governance. This 
paradox was identified by Pollitt and his/her colleagues in their book published in 1999  




Put (2011) claims that there is no direct link between due processes (i.e., certain management 
practices) and results. Often public policymakers and managers work in a context of ill-
defined means-end relationships; thus it seldom suffices to focus solely on compliance with 
such processes. Rectifying processes does not automatically guarantee that results are 
achieved.  
 
Nonetheless, as the articles included in this thesis demonstrate, the auditees themselves seem 
not to attach importance to either the auditor’s role or the type of report. What matters is how 
they judge the quality of the report, their opinion of the audit institution, their experience with 
making improvements and the extent to which their comments were taken into account in the 
auditing process.  
 
SAIs conduct very specific types of examination compared with the evaluation community. 
Evaluators tend to have a broader scope, use more diverse methods and techniques of 
intervention and put more stress on the importance of dialogue in the evaluation process, 
whereas in performance auditing there is a certain tension between the auditors providing 
guidance to the auditees and maintaining their independence. And because they also need to 
remain independent of pressure from politicians and interest groups, SAIs can apply to a more 
limited extent only the involvement of stakeholders, which helps to increase usage of the 
auditors’ performance audits reports (Lonsdale, 2011; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 
2011).  
 
There are institutional, cultural and political inhibitions for SAIs developing into evaluative 
institutions. Public auditors are part of an authoritative system of controls that is central to 
democratic government and must base their work on statutory powers and a mandate that 
defines the limits of their authority (Summa, 1999). Although some authors argue that 
performance auditing should be classified as evaluation rather than auditing (Barzelay, 1996), 
the work of SAIs is bound to be done from the standpoint of guardianship and control, while 
their fundamental role is to hold public bodies to account for the expenditure of public funds 






The SAI’s assessments 
Based on the design of the performance audit (the audit questions, the audit criteria, 
methodology and so forth) and empirical findings, the role of SAIs is to assess whether the 
performance and compliance of auditees meet expectations.  
 
According to Majone (1989), the design of evaluations depends on both the measurability of 
the outcome and the predictability of the production function. Put (2011) customized this 
assertion for the case of the performance audit (see Table 1 below). 
 
 Table 1: Choice of the most appropriate type of performance audit 
 




 Complete Incomplete 
High 1.Audit of processes, 
including an estimation of 
the consequences of 
dysfunctional processes 
3.Audit of results, 
followed by an 
analysis to explain 
shortfalls in results 
Low 2. Audit of processes, 
including an explanatory 
analysis to explain 
dysfunctions 
4. Difficult to audit in 
a meaningful way 
 
Source: Put V. (2011), “Norms used: some strategic considerations from The Netherlands and 
the UK”, in J. Lonsdale, P. Wilkins & T. Ling (eds.), Performance Auditing. Contributing to 
Accountability in Democratic Government, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 
85.  
 
Table 1 illustrates for which aspects of their conduct – processes or results – auditees should 
be held to account and under which conditions.  
Fukuyama (2013) disagrees with this accountability system. In his view, results are hard to 
measure and/or separate from procedural and normative measures. He also argues that it is 
difficult to isolate the efforts of public entities from the overall environment in which they 
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operate. Measuring results and tracing their causes are both “impossible” tasks and auditors 
may not have the competence to do either. As an alternative, Fukuyama suggests that 
capacity, measured by the professionalization of the bureaucracy, and the degree of 
autonomization are the best indicators of quality of government in developed countries. He 
thereby expresses distrust in the effectiveness of NPM instruments of control. Moreover, his 
arguments reclaim trust in a profession that has been under pressure from NPM systems 
(Ferlie & Geraghty, 2005).  
 
In 1977, a task force studying the Norwegian parliament’s control over public administration 
expressed doubt as to whether auditors had the competence to undertake performance auditing 
(Stortinget, 1977). Research suggests that the competence of auditors has become an issue in 
practice. Often the audit institutions assess management systems and compliance rather than 
results and outcomes. Many auditors act path dependently by strengthening their traditional 
role as “public accountant” instead of working in new ways (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; 
Helgøy & Serigstad, 2004; Pollitt et al., 1999).  
 
There are several reasons why auditors tend to apply the criteria of good management and/or  
conformity to procedures rather than quantified measures of efficiency and effectiveness. 
Examining whether an operating system conforms to a particular model or rule is close to the 
auditor’s traditional task of verification. Moreover, it is often the case that audit institutions 
have limited skills at their disposal. This may reinforce existing cultural dispositions that 
favour “checking” over “analyzing” modes of audit. Using precise criteria as the basis for 
assessments could turn the performance audit into a simple “pass or fail” test (Pollitt & Mul, 
1999). To bring about improvement, it is important to provide a basis for informed decisions. 
Thus Put argues that, irrespective of the focus of the performance audit, the auditor should 
always include explanations of the shortfalls in the observed results (Put, 2011).  
 
The above discussion on the content of the performance audit has highlighted the diverse 
criticism made of auditors. If preoccupied with auditing policy outcomes, they are accused of 
being political. If sticking to an assessment of compliance, they are accused of having too 
narrow a focus and of being incompetent. Therefore, contrary to Power’s allegations, this 







Control refers to the mechanisms and instruments that are used by the controlling party in 
order to influence the decisions and behaviour of the controlled party with the aim of 
achieving the objectives of the controlling party. There are three types of control: ex ante 
control – systems of planning and target-setting; ex nunc control – systems of monitoring; and 
ex post control – systems of evaluation, rewards, sanctions and feedback (Verhoest, Roness, 
Verschuere, Rubecksen, & MacCarthaigh, 2010, p 24). In this thesis, the control of SAIs is 
placed in the last category – namely ex post control. Its preventive effect, however, would 
have to be categorized as ex ante control. 
 
Instrumental control 
The Anglo-Saxon concept of control has two different meanings in the Norwegian language: 
steering actions before they take place and monitoring actions after they have occurred. 
“Control” is broader than accountability and can include both ex ante and ex post mechanisms 
of directing behaviour – for example, proactive means of steering conduct through directives, 
financial incentives or laws and regulations (Bovens, 2007a).  
 
Auditors’ understanding of “control” is “being in control”, that is, handling risks by securing 
checks and balances and smooth operations in a system. The Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), whose mission is provide control 
frameworks and guidance for auditors, describes control as a system and process of risk 
management and internal control that integrates  those concerns (COSO, 2004, 2005a, 2005b).  
 
Auditors have a distinctly top-down perspective – or, put another way, a funder’s perspective. 
The funder is preoccupied with control to secure the sound management of resources and 
good results. But this “control” can conflict with the controlled party’s autonomy (Rubecksen, 
2009). Detailed controls in a system can be experienced as contrary to personal control and 
organizational learning (Hvid, 2009; Karasek & Theorell, 1994). This is a bottom-up 
perspective focusing on working conditions and trying to identify optimal conditions for 
organizational learning, including evaluating and ultimately improving the system (Amble, 
2012; Argyris, 1999; Herbst, 1993; Karasek Jr, 1979).  In this thesis, I take primarily a top-




Control in both NPM and the management by objectives and results (MBOR) systems is more 
geared towards controlling results than checking compliance with  rules. It entails giving local 
managers a certain amount of leeway over how to solve tasks as long as results are obtained. 
The system is often assumed to be based on a Tayloristic and instrumental understanding of 
control that focuses on the system and the technology without regard for its influence on the 
social system (Taylor, 1967). Politically defined goals are to be operationalized and 
implemented by civil servants. Civil servants are to report back on the results achieved and 
are then to be rewarded or punished according to the level of goal attainment (Christensen, 
Lægreid, Roness, & Røvik, 2007). Potentially, MBOR could also be part of open learning 
systems that affect agenda-setting, decision-making and the implementation of decisions 
(Ezzamel, Hyndman, Johnsen, & Lapsley, 2008). 
 
The Norwegian Office of the Auditor General bases its control on the MBOR system as the 
official state control system in Norway. It thus takes the instrumental perspective of control as 
its point of departure. In this thesis, I examine how the fundamentals of this theory match the 
empirical reality.  
 
Accountability mechanisms are important in controlling the conduct of public entities, but 
control mechanisms are not mechanisms of accountability per se. Accountability implies that 
actors have to explain and justify their conduct to various forums. Nonetheless, control 
mechanisms (such as internal control) can be a method to ensure those who hold to account 













2.3. Accountability  
Democratic accountability is the hallmark of modern democratic governance. Democracy 
remains a project on paper if those in power cannot be held accountable. Citizens, who are the 
primary principals in a democracy, transfer their sovereignty to political representatives and 
civil servants (Bovens, 2005). The SAI is an administrative tool that the parliament uses to 
hold the government administration accountable for its use of the taxpayer’s money.  
 
There are three functions of democratic accountability: first, to hold civil servants 
constitutionally accountable, which implies an assessment in a court of law based on the 
Constitution; second to hold civil servants democratically accountable based on the will of the 
parliament (Bovens, 2005); and third, to improve performance. The first two functions 
contribute to prevention while the third should foster individual or institutional learning 
(Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000).  
 
Definition of accountability 
The concept of accountability has been much discussed (Schillemans, 2011, 2013) and can be 
understood in many ways (Mulgan, 2000). In line with Bovens’ concept of accountability, I 
regard the accountability relationship as a social “mechanism”. The actor is held accountable 
by a forum and must provide explanations and justify its conduct (Bovens, 2010; Schillemans, 
2011).  In this thesis, “holding to account” is understood primarily as the ministries’ 
obligation to answer to the parliament about the execution of their responsibilities 
(Bemelmans-Videc, Lonsdale, & Perrin, 2007, p. 241); more specifically, they must answer to 
the parliamentary control committee. Besides being accountable to the parliament, the 
ministries must explain themselves to the SAI. Entities, not individuals, are held to account in 
this accountability hierarchy, while the top executive is responsible for his/her entity (Bovens, 
2005).  
 
What ministries are held to account for 
What a SAI holds ministries to account for varies from administrative system to 
administrative system. For example, it can hold ministries to account for results, compliance 
or good management practices (Aucoin et al., 2000; Behn, 2001; Grönlund et al., 2011; Pollitt 




To enhance performance, it is important to improve the learning capacity and effectiveness of 
public administration. In the NPM/MBOR system, performance auditing is therefore meant to 
be outcome-oriented. To secure value for money, the principal controls the way public funds 
are spent (Bovens, 2007b). In the Weberian hierarchical system, importance is attached to 
checking compliance with the law and regulations as well as processes and procedures and to 
monitoring the government’s conduct for the abuse or misuse of public authority. It is also 
important to check whether rules have been applied with fairness and equity (Aucoin & 
Heintzman, 2000; Behn, 2001; Bovens, 2007b). In post-NPM systems of governance, 
accountability is less clear than in traditional hierarchical government, while cooperation 
between administrative units at different levels is a success criterion and thus important to 
control (Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2011).  
 
The obligation to render account 
The obligation to render account can be vertical, diagonal or horizontal. “Vertical 
accountability” refers to a situation where the forum formally wields power over the actor, 
perhaps owing to the hierarchical relationship between the actor and the forum – as in the case 
of the minister who is accountable to the parliament. The majority of political accountability 
arrangements that are based on delegation from principal to agent are forms of vertical 
accountability. In most cases of legal accountability, too, the forum has the formal authority to 
compel the actor to render account, although this is based not on a principal–agent 
relationship but on laws and regulations. The same applies to disciplinary committees in the 
case of professional accountability.  
 
In “diagonal accountability”, the administrative forum – such as the audit institution –  stands 
in no direct hierarchical relationship to the public entities and has few powers to enforce 
compliance. However, the majority of these administrative forums ultimately report to the 
minister or to the parliament and in this way derive informal power.  
 
In “horizontal accountability”, rendering account to the media and various stakeholders in 
society occurs on a voluntary basis – that is, with no intervention on the part of the principal 
(Bovens, 2007a). In the media, the SAI and the government administration are held 
informally to account in an ongoing debate – that is, in an interplay in which various 
stakeholders advocate their interests. Such accountability mechanisms are not based on the 
obligation to render account and do not entail the formal possibility of sanctioning, only the 
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informal possibility of “naming and shaming”. Instead, stakeholders appeal to moral 
obligations. However, media interest can prompt politicians to react through hierarchical 
accountability mechanisms (Bovens, 2007a). 
 
These above-mentioned forms of accountability have been identified as important by other 
researchers on accountability both before and since Bovens’ contribution (Ezzamel et al., 
2008; Stone, 1995). However, they have been conceptualized somewhat differently. 
 
The accountability of the government to the parliament is inherently political. It is the 
parliament that, on behalf of the voters, holds the minister to account for the SAI’s findings. 
The accountability of the ministries to the SAI is diagonal because the latter serves as an 
administrative agent for the parliament (Bovens, 2005). From this hierarchical relationship the 
SAI derives informal power (Bovens, 2007b) – informal, because auditors cannot formally 
sanction auditees (Put, 2011). The implication of this relationship is that the SAI’s influence 
depends on the reactions of the parliamentary control committee. 
 
The various phases of the accountability process 
From an analytical perspective, the accountability process can be divided into three phases: 
the information phase; the debating phase; and the consequences phase (Bovens, 2010; 
Schillemans, 2011). 
 
The “information phase” is that during which data are collected from the audited entity. 
Subsequently, when the report has been completed, the ministry is allowed to take issue with 
the SAI’s findings (the “debating phase”). This debate between the SAI and the ministry is 
included in the report that is sent to the parliamentary control committee. If the committee 
requests the minister or civil servants to respond to the findings or initiates a hearing, this 
could be interpreted as a continuation of the debate. However, if the committee displays this 
much interest in the SAI’s findings, it clearly finds them worrisome. Its interest can therefore 
be interpreted as a sanction in itself (the “consequences phase”). Lesser sanctions could be 
specific demands or comments made by a majority of committee members in the committee’s 
proposal to the parliament. 
 
The formal sanctions that the parliament can impose against the government administration 
are impeachment (last used in Norway in 1926-27) and a vote of no confidence (Sejersted, 
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2000). The fact that these sanctions are seldom used does not mean that the government and 
its administration are not held to account. Ministers are regularly exposed to criticism, serious 
or otherwise, that can apply pressure on them, weaken their political position or even force 
them to resign (Nordby, 2004).  
 
The impact of control cannot be judged from the number of impeachments and votes of no 
confidence. Rather, the criterion for such a judgment is whether misconduct is uncovered, 
responsibility is assigned to where it belongs and consequences ensue for the accountable 
party (Nordby, 2004). In this respect, accountability can be understood as the extent to which 
an individual or entity is exposed to criticism (Eckhoff & Jacobsen, 1960).  
 
The responsibility of ministers 
The dichotomy between politicians, who make policies, and administrators, who are to 
execute those policies in the technically most efficient way, has long been debated (Svara, 
1999). It is hard to know when the decision-making process ceases to be a policy choice and 
becomes a mere administrative procedure. Discretion is exercised at all administrative levels, 
even among street bureaucrats. This has implications for accountability. In the Norwegian 
system, ministries are held accountable both for their own actions and for those of civil 
servants in subordinate entities (Rose, 1987). This means that ministers have to assume 
responsibility for events for which they cannot personally be blamed (Nordby, 2004; 
Sejersted, 2002). 
 
In Norway, since the 1980s there has been a delegation of tasks from ministries to agencies 
and state-owned companies, followed by a period of increased management through 
governance and networks (Lægreid, Roness, & Rolland, 2013). This has increasingly 
complicated the practice of holding to account and exacerbated the problem of assigning 
responsibility because the system is at risk of becoming fragmented. Contractual relationships 
change accountability relationships and may reduce the public authorities’ ability to be in 
control; but at the same time it is often the case that the public authorities cannot continue to 
deliver the same services within their own organizations (Klingner, Nalbandian, & Romzek, 
2002). 
  
The principle of objective responsibility is important for the parliament to be able to exercise 
its control. It resolves the “problem of many eyes” (identifying to whom or to what civil 
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servants are accountable) because a clear principal-agent hierarchy is established (Bovens, 
2005). Furthermore, it simplifies the process and motivates ministers to prevent misconduct 
(Nordby, 2004). The ministries themselves support this principle, even though in recent years 
delegation has weakened their powers (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006).  
 
Who is accountable 
In real life, accountability is not defined by simple principal-agent relationships. Public 
services are increasingly organized into networks of public and private providers of services 
that cooperate in an intricate manner and have to live up to the expectations of different 
stakeholders. These new organizational forms and implementation structures are a challenge 
both for the ministries that are held to account and for the auditors. Results achieved in a 
certain policy area are based on the decisions and activities of many different actors, not 
merely on the actions of ministries. It thus becomes hard to identify who is responsible for 
which outcome (Romzek, 2011). The problem of assigning responsibility is called the 
“problem of many hands” (Bovens, 2005) and is characteristic of complex modern societies 
(Day & Klein, 1987; Thompson, 1980). 
 
3. State of the art literature 
Much scholarly literature has been critical about the way auditors carry out their mandate. It 
argues that the auditors’ scope and methods are too narrow (Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000; 
Bowerman, Raby, & Humphrey, 2000; Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; Gendron, Cooper, & 
Townley, 2007; Lapsley & Lonsdale, 2010; Leeuw, 1996; Morin, 2008, 2010, 2011; Power, 
1997, 2000; Power, M., 2003; Power, M. K., 2003; Radcliffe, 2011; Reichborn-Kjennerud & 
Johnsen, 2011; Skærbæk, 2009; Strathern, 2000; Sutherland, 2003). Other scholarly literature 
is more descriptive, with the aim of clarifying what performance auditing is. Many such 
commentaries are written by auditors themselves (Ahlenius, 2000; Arthur et al., 2012; Bourn, 
2007; Gunvaldsen & Karlsen, 1999; Lonsdale, 2000, 2008; Van der Knaap, 2011) and explain 
methodologies or strategies. In addition, there are more descriptive contributions by scholars 
in the fields of public management and administration, accounting, political science and law 
(Barzelay, 1996, 1997; Bowerman, Humphrey, & Owen, 2003; Christensen, Helgesen, & 
Lægreid, 2003; Christensen, Laegreid, & Roness, 2002; Grönlund et al., 2011; Justesen & 
Skærbek, 2010; Lapsley & Pong, 2000; Nordby, 2004; Pollitt, 2003; Pollitt & Summa, 1997; 
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Roberts & Pollitt, 1994; Sejersted, 2000, 2002; Sterck, 2007). There also exists empirical 
research on how auditors choose and operationalize the audit criteria that they use as the basis 
for their judgments (Keen, 1999; Nutley, Levitt, Solesbury, & Martin, 2012; Put, 2011; Put & 
Bouckaert, 2011). 
 
Recent contributions in the field of performance auditing include publications that investigate 
the aspects of organization, methodology, quality of audit reports, learning processes and to 
what extent auditors are able to respond to auditees’ concerns (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 2007; 
Lonsdale et al., 2011; Morin, 2008, 2010; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2011; Van Der 
Knaap, 2006, 2011). Some authors have specifically dealt with local government auditing 
(Batac & Carassus, 2009; Clausen & Madsen, 2009; Johnsen, 2003; Johnsen, Meklin, 
Oulasvirta, & Vakkuri, 2001; Opedal & Østtveiten, 2000; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 
2011; Tillema & Ter Bogt, 2010; Weets, 2011). At this level, the questions of impact and 
accountability are also relevant. 
 
Important earlier contributions include reference books such as The Audit Society (Power, 
1997), which is critical of the auditors’ systems and methods; and the more descriptive 
Performance or Compliance? Performance Audit and Public Management in Five Countries, 
which compares performance auditing in several countries (Pollitt et al., 1999). The latter 
book explores what auditors hold auditees accountable for – performance or compliance. This 
is linked to the training that auditors receive and the culture in audit institutions. The book’s 
findings confirm that auditors audit mainly control systems rather than efficiency and 
effectiveness, both of which are central to their mandate.  
 
In Norway, Fredrik Sejersted (2000) defines efficient control as the extent to which a SAI is 
successful in uncovering misconduct, the extent to which it assigns responsibility and whether 
the control exercised entails consequences. Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid studied civil 
servants’ perception of the role of the SAI  after its reorganization in 1996 and the new 
emphasis on performance auditing that followed (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006). They also 
analysed the revitalized role of the SAI in a report on democracy and the distribution of power 
in Norwegian society (Christensen et al., 2003). Several dissertations submitted to the 
universities of Bergen and Oslo have dealt with performance auditing too. Topics include the 
parliamentary control committee and its relation to the SAI (Søreng, 2002), the mandate and 
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organization of the SAI (Glückstad, 2006), the development of performance auditing (Grahm-
Haga, 2006) and the content of the performance audit (Lundell, 2012). 
 
In their study of accountability mechanisms, the Danish researchers Justesen and Skærbek 
(2010) show how the SAI’s repeated insistence that its decisions are implemented and its 
continued involvement over time in the audited entity lead to  the implementation of a control 
system and furnish  the ministries with a new identity – one more concerned with controlling 
subordinated entities. They thereby demonstrate how the SAI’s agenda inevitably involves 
increased steering and control. Furthermore, they show how this attention over time might be 
more important for the influence of the SAI than are single reports, which are the primary 
focus of this thesis. Justesen also explored the content of the audit: what characterizes the 
performance audit as text and genre and how it is used (Justesen, 2008). Kjær (1996) 
compared Swedish and Danish reports and found that the Swedish reports investigated 
broader issues than its Danish counterparts and that Swedish performance audit was closer to 
the evaluative tradition in performance audit. 
 
The Swedish researcher Ahlbäck (1999) assessed the Swedish SAI’s ability to conduct 
independent audits and questioned its responsiveness to the auditees’ needs and close 
relationship to the ministries. This book was published at a time when the Swedish SAI 
reported to the government; it has since been reorganized and now reports to the parliament. 
Recently, Bringselius assessed the performance of the Swedish SAI (Bringselius, 2011).   
 
There is little research to date on the impact of performance auditing (De Vries et al., 2000; 
Morin, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2008; Wilkins & Boyle, 2011). In a review of existing research on 
the subject, only 14 studies dealing specifically with the impact of the performance audit were 
found (Van Loocke & Put, 2011).  
 
A recent contribution to this body of literature has been Alwardat (2010), which focuses on 
the perception and impact of the performance audit. Alwardat’s qualitative research 
demonstrated that a majority of the auditees interviewed by him doubted the auditors’ 
competence and ability to provide value-added recommendations. There were major concerns 
about the materiality of their findings as well as the accuracy and fairness of their reports 
(Alwardat, 2010). Tillema et al. (2010) reached a similar conclusion in their quantitative 
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survey. They also pointed to the problem of reports having less relevance when auditors failed 
to take auditees’ comments into account.  
 
Danielle Morin (2003) examined the role that performance auditors play in Canada and 
whether their relations with auditees differ. She found that the response of auditees to 
performance auditors who have an improvement agenda is not more positive than their 
response to conservative performance auditors and that conservative performance auditors 
have a bigger impact. Part of her explanation for this finding was that it takes time to get used 
to new roles. Another reason could be the more traditional culture in the Canadian SAI and its 
more limited mandate (Morin, 2003). 
 
By contrast, compliance auditing is seldom the main focus of the Norwegian SAI; instead, it  
is often coupled with assessments of the MBOR system. Unlike in Canada (as explained in 
Morin’s research), the usefulness of the audit report is not contingent on the auditor’s role in 
Norway but rather on the communication process, on the quality of the report, the legitimacy 
of the SAI and the contributions it makes to improvement. This demonstrates that the 
influence of auditors can vary from country to country depending on the culture in the SAI, 
how it is organized and what its mandate is. Morin (2008) also assessed the impact of auditors 
on the basis of survey data. Using factor analysis to confirm predefined indicators, she 
concluded that auditors were influential when the results for an indicator exceeded a score of 
three on a five-point (Likert) scale.  
 
In this thesis, I, too, seek to contribute to an understanding of the impact of performance 
auditing. The current study is an empirical investigation of performance auditing as a 
component of the system of democratic accountability. It also addresses the conceptual 








Nearly every state in the world has a SAI. In 2012, the International Organization of 
Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) had 191 full members (190 national SAIs and the 
European Court of Auditors) and four associate members. Founded in 1953, INTOSAI is 
the umbrella organization of SAIs worldwide (Noussi, 2012).  
 
While all SAIs adopt the International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs), 
they differ sharply in terms of organizational structure, mode of operation and the types of 
audit on which they traditionally focus. There are three main models of SAI organizational 
structure: the judicial model (court of audit), the monocratic model (or “Westminster type”) 
and the board model (Noussi, 2012).  
 
The “judicial model”, or court of audit, has both judicial and administrative authority and is 
an integral part of the judiciary. Its staff composed mostly of qualified lawyers. The 
traditional purpose of this type of SAI is to conduct compliance audits, but today it also 
conducts financial and performance audits. Courts of audit are prevalent in the Latin 
countries of Europe as well as in Greece, Turkey and most former French, Spanish and 
Portuguese colonies.  
 
The “Monocratic model”, or “audit office”, is an independent body, headed by an auditor 
general, that reports to the parliament (Arthur et al., 2012). The audit office has no judicial 
function but, if warranted, its findings may be passed onto legal authorities for further 
action. This type of SAI is found in many Commonwealth countries (the United Kingdom, 
Australia, Canada, India and a large number of Anglophone countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the  Caribbean and the Pacific region) as well as in Austria, the Nordic countries, 
Ireland, the United States and parts of Latin America (for example, Chile).  
 
The third type of SAI, the “board model”, resembles the monocratic model in that it does 
not have a judicial function, is independent of the executive and helps the parliament 
perform oversight. It is headed by a board rather than a single person (Arthur et al., 2012). 
This type of audit system is used in Germany and The Netherlands as well as in many Asian 
countries (Noussi, 2012). The Norwegian SAI is organized along the lines of  the 




Beginning in the 1990s, public administration in Norway was reorganized in accordance 
with international reform trends. Labelled new public management (NPM), those trends 
attached less importance to management by rules than to efficiency to be achieved through 
tender, management by objectives and results (MBOR) and delegation of administrative 
tasks. As a result of those reforms, the autonomy of public administration increased as the 
parliament granted it more freedom in the allocation of the budget. With the increased 
delegation of tasks to agencies, elected representatives faced an increasingly complex 
public administration and could not control it to the same extent as previously through laws 
and funding (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011; Sejersted, 2002).  
 
With the introduction of NPM, executive agencies were turned into performance-based 
entities that were to be held accountable for results (Behn, 2001). It thus became more and 
more important for the control apparatus to orient itself towards checking performance. This 
led to new mandates for the SAI and required changes in the auditor’s focus and work 
methods (Riksrevisjonen, 2005). 
 
4.1 The Norwegian parliament’s control function 
The Norwegian SAI, as we know it today, was founded in 1918. It functions as the control 
tool of the parliament (Storting) but has an independent status. The object of its control is 
the government administration but not ministers – as only the parliament can hold ministers 
to account (Nordby, 2004; Sejersted, 2002). Control of the executive power is one of the 
most important tasks of the Norwegian parliament. This was specified in the Norwegian 
Constitution of 1814 (Stortinget, 2002-2003).  
 
The parliament’s supervision can be defined as the investigation, assessment and sanctioning 
of decisions, actions or omissions on the part of the government and/or the government 
administration (Stortinget, 2002-2003, p. 15). The purpose of performance auditing by the 
Office of the Auditor General is to deliver relevant information about the implementation and 
effectiveness of government measures taken on the basis of the decisions and intentions of the 





When debating the “Act and Instructions relating to the Office of the Auditor General”, the 
parliamentary control committee emphasized that the SAI’s primary function was to 
contribute to improvement and learning rather than to hold to account, (see Recommendation 
to the Storting No. 136 [2003–2004] (Stortinget, 2004)). Performance auditing can be used to 
identify errors and omissions with the aim of contributing to improvement, which is its 
primary purpose. It is to be used not for the purposes of political rivalry but to assist civil 
servants in identifying deficiencies that can be subsequently rectified (Sejersted, 2002). 
However, Document No. 14 (2002–2003), which deals with the Storting’s control over the 
government and the government administration, also pointed out that assigning responsibility 
would, in itself, improve the government administration (Stortinget ,2002-2003). Thus 
holding to account and contributing to improvement are both important tasks of the SAI.  
 
4.2 The development of parliamentary control in Norway 
Before the 1990s, control of the executive power had low priority for the Norwegian 
parliament.  Its two other main functions – adopting laws and overseeing funding –  were 
prioritized. During the 1990s many reforms pertaining to the Norwegian parliament’s control 
function changed these priorities.  
 
From 1918 onwards, the Norwegian SAI was subordinated to the parliament. From 1815 to 
1972 parliamentary control over the government and its ministries was supervised by a 
protocol committee in the “Odelsting” (the legislative chamber of the parliament). It quickly 
became apparent that the decentralized review of ministerial protocols was not sufficiently 
safeguarding the need for oversight and coordination. A control committee, appointed in 
1981, took over most oversight functions. In 1992 all tasks related to control were assigned to 
a new parliamentary control committee called the Standing Committee for Scrutiny and 
Constitutional affairs (Nordby, 2004). The creation of this committee resulted in the 
strengthening of the parliament’s supervisory role since the committee had wider powers than 
its predecessors. Other important reforms include the establishment of open hearings and  the 
Norwegian Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight Committee (EOS Committee), more 
extensive parliamentary questioning and increased performance auditing. Today a minority of 
one-third of the members of the control committee can demand hearings and question 
agencies as well as ministries, even though it will be the ministries that are formally 
accountable (Christensen et al., 2002; Stortinget, 2002-2003).  
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Article 75 of the Constitution stipulates that the SAI is politically neutral and independent and 
that it makes assessments without interference from the parliament. In 1993, for the first time, 
the parliament instructed the SAI to conduct an investigation. In the years that followed, it 
increasingly sent informal signals about cases in which it wanted an investigation (Sejersted, 
2002). This development notwithstanding, the SAI still initiates most of its own 
investigations. On average, it produces 10–15 performance audit reports a year. 
 
4.3 The organization of the Office of the Auditor General 
The Norwegian SAI is the parliament’s most important control body outside of the 
parliament. It is led by a board of five auditors general, whose chairman is the chief executive 
officer of the SAI. The auditors general are former politicians elected by a parliamentary 
committee for a term of four years. The administrative management is led by a secretary 
general. Auditors general can stand for re-election. 
 
Over the years, SAIs have adapted to modern government. Historically, the Norwegian SAI 
assessed the finances of the public administration, but from the 1960s onwards it started to 
control state owned corporations; after the 1970s its mandate was changed to include an 
assessment of the public administration’s performance. From the 1980s it conducted 
performance audits on a regular basis. These went largely unnoticed until the 1990s, when the 
parliament’s control function was enhanced (Sejersted, 2002) and the SAI underwent internal 
reorganization. From 1994 onwards the SAI’s performance audits were reported separately (in 
the Document 3 series, (Stortinget, 2002-2003). From 1996 onwards performance auditing 
was undertaken by a separate department within the SAI, and in 2002 two performance 
auditing departments were created. In 2004 a new law on the SAI codified current practice, 
including the right to use performance auditing to scrutinize state-owned companies 
(Glückstad, 2006; Nordby, 2004).  
 
The organizational changes described above have led to increased control activity (Sejersted, 
2002; Søreng, 2002) and enhanced the SAI’s relevance as the parliament’s control organ. This 
process began with the Ingvaldsen report of 1977, which expressed concern over the 
extensive delegation of tasks from ministries to subordinate agencies and demanded increased 
control (Grahm-Haga, 2006; Stortinget, 1977, 2002-2003). The increase in performance 
auditing resulted also from the introduction of the MBOR system in Norway in the 1990s 
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(Nordby, 2004). Under this system, control over the ministries’ performance was emphasized 
more than due process, which plays a central role in the Weberian paradigm of the 
professional bureaucracy.  
 
The SAI is funded by the parliament and is independent vis-à-vis the government 
administration. It sends its final reports to the ministries and the focus of those reports is the 
ministries’ control of subordinate entities, which is in addition to the entities’ own internal 
control as well other external supervision, including that of the courts and the media. Counties 
and municipalities can be subject to control, too, when the purpose is to monitor the use of 
state funding (Sejersted, 2002; Stortinget, 2002-2003). 
 
4.4 The mandate of the Office of the Auditor General and how it relates to 
practice 
There is tension between the political logic of control and the auditor’s aim of contributing to 
improvements in public administration. Through control, errors and omissions are identified 
and the accountable party faces criticism and other reactions. This prevents the misuse of 
power and is a central function of democracy. At the same time, accountability creates 
conflict and inhibits. Thus there is a limit to how much the parliament can and should control. 
Even though a central goal of performance auditing is to evaluate, reform and improve, it is 
difficult to know when a report will be used by the control committee to hold the government 
administration to account (Sejersted, 2002). In addition, the relationship between central and 
local government control poses potential problems. The SAI controls the municipalities’ 
use of funding from the state (Helgøy & Serigstad, 2004), but this can conflict with the 
principle of local autonomy.  
 
In the parliament, performance audit reports can be used in what is intended to be an open 
arena for debate and deliberation of arguments. However, these reports can be used as an 
opposition tool, while governing politicians will seek to protect their ministers (Eckhoff & 
Jacobsen, 1960). A majority government can, for example, oppose justified demands for 
investigations.  
 
Since the advent of performance auditing, the Norwegian SAI has gradually become a more 
visible institution. Its reports and assessments feature more prominently in the media than 
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before. This is mainly because of increased interest in performance audit reports that are 
more politically relevant than is the traditional financial audit. Since 2004 performance 
audit reports are withheld from public scrutiny until the parliament has received them; this 
allows the ministries to be more prepared for the criticism they may have to face (Law No. 
21 “On the Office of the Auditor General, 2004). But to accommodate journalists, the 
performance audit reports are presented at press conferences the same day that the 
parliament receives them (Østtveiten, 2012). This more active and more open media 
strategy of the SAI reflects the new priorities of the auditor general in office since  2006, 
Jørgen Kosmo (Bakli, Sundby, & Botnheim, 2012). After he had taken office, press 
conferences, an active communications strategy and  a dedicated communications team 
were all introduced. Before becoming auditor general, Kosmo was a politician, a member of 
the parliamentary control committee, minister of justice, minister of defence and minister of 
public administration and used the media more actively than his predecessors as auditor 
general. 
 
The parliament also increasingly uses performance audit reports to hold ministers to 
account, albeit first and foremost in the most controversial cases. Most of the performance 
audits trigger a dialogue between the SAI and the ministries that does not involve the 
parliamentary control committee (Sejersted, 2002).  
 
The ministries regard the SAI and the parliament’s control over them as important. 
Nonetheless, they are critical about the SAI. Performance auditing demands a significant 
amount of their time and resources (Bakli et al., 2012). Furthermore, the ministries frequently 
perceive the SAI’s assessments as too detail-oriented and not important enough to deserve the 
MPs’ attention. In a study conducted 10 years ago, ministers stated that the SAI was driven by 
the need for legitimacy and that its investigations were not always helpful. According to the 
ministries, increased control renders them more reticent and fearful of engaging in new policy 
initiatives (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006). 
 
In a series of newspaper articles and debates in the autumn of 2012, former ministers 
expressed dissatisfaction with the SAI’s control, accusing it of being political and too detail-
oriented. They argued that this leads to civil servants becoming risk-averse, which, in return, 
results in a more bureaucratic and less innovative public administration (Kinander, 2012b; 
Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2012).  
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5. The analytical approach 
Performance auditing is only one of many sources of information, including evaluation and 
statistical analysis, on which policymakers base their decisions (Weiss, 1978). So far there has 
been a mismatch between the supply and use of such policy-relevant social knowledge. Initial 
optimism about the potential of knowledge turned to gloom when it became increasingly clear, in 
the 1970s, that these various efforts were not living up to expectations. Consequently a large 
number of initiatives in the field of knowledge utilization were undertaken to bridge the gap 
between research and policy. Moreover, critical voices questioned the instrumental presupposition 
that politics can be reduced to objectives, alternatives and the costs and probabilities of different 
courses of action (Wittrock, 1982).  
 
Like knowledge utilization literature, I use a rational-instrumental perspective to understand the 
use of information. In addition, I use various strands of institutional theory that reflect the fact 
that knowledge becomes part of a discourse in which (self-)reflecting participants debate 
norms and alternatives with a view to concrete action (Albaek, 1995). This mix of theories 
can be described as a multi-paradigm approach aimed at obtaining insights (Roness, 1997).  
 
5.1 Rational-instrumental theories 
According to the logic of consequentiality, actors are assumed in rational-instrumental theories to 
be rational and oriented towards attaining goals. They evaluate various alternatives and 
consequences and choose the right means to succeed (March & Olsen, 1989). This logic also 
applies to organizations. Certain assumptions of this theory are not always fulfilled, however; and 
this complicates the means-end relationship. 
 
In a hierarchical organization, there is the assumption of a principal-agent relationship whereby 
the principal efficiently controls the agent and the agent is accountable to the principal. This 
principal-agent theory is dominant in accountability studies (Schillemans, 2013). Systems are 
built to steer and control these rational actors. NPM systems and techniques use various incentives 
and organizational instruments to lead the actors in the desired direction (Strøm, 2000). However, 
subunits that have conflicting interests and ambitions can thwart the head of the institution’s 
ability to obtain the desired objectives. Even though each actor is rational, the final result can be a 
compromise rather than what was initially planned. This is a version of rational-instrumental 
theory with a main focus on negotiations (Christensen et al., 2007). Successful control by the 
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principal will be contingent on the actors’ bounded rationality. Frequently, actors will opt for a 
satisfactory, rather than ideal, solution, given that reality is complex and that it is costly and time-
consuming to obtain an overview of all possible alternatives (Christensen et al., 2007; Simon, 
1997).  There is also the risk that agents are not sufficiently competent for the task at hand or that 
they act against the interests of the principal or have interests that conflict with those of the 
principal (Strøm, 2000). Ex post control mechanisms, such as external auditing, are applied to   
avert such risks (Strøm, 2000).  
 
For agents to act in accordance with the principal’s presuppositions, it is not sufficient that those 
agents are rational. In rational social action, two major components are needed to effectively 
influence other agents: rational calculation, including knowledge of the means with which the 
goals can be maximized; and control over others. Here, control means that the principal can 
intentionally produce responses from the agent. Various mechanisms exist to make such 
control efficient; these include social influence mechanisms such as expert power and 
legitimacy (Dahl & Lindblom, 1953; Jørgensen, 1987; Raven, 1992).  
 
In its ideal-typical form, parliamentary democracy is a chain of delegation and accountability – 
one that stretches from the voters to the ultimate policymakers (Strøm, 2000). The voters are the 
ultimate principal (see Figure 1 above).They delegate decision-making powers to the parliament 
in order to safeguard their interests. In the context of this thesis, I am particularly interested in the 
parliament’s control of the government and its ministries through the SAI’s performance audits. 
The core question is how this control works. I assess whether the system of performance auditing 
is working according to the assumptions of this framework.  
 
Evaluation (and therefore performance auditing) can be said to upgrade the scientific content 
of politics and downgrade the importance of value-based components in decision-making 
(Eliadis, Furubo, & Jacob, 2011). The end use of performance audit reports is inevitably 
political, but the choice and execution of audits is administrative, based on rational 
assessments of probabilities and the consequences of undesired events. They are part of a 
paradigm that deems it possible to distinguish between political goals and the more 




5.2 Institutional theory 
Institutional theories conceptualize actors as oriented more towards established norms than 
towards rational calculation with the aim of attaining goals. What drives actors is what they 
regard as appropriate in the situation in which they find themselves and in the environment 
with which they identify (March & Olsen, 1989). Above all, they try to identify the correct 
responses to given situations. Actors do this through knowledge of norms and rules and how 
they apply; at the same time, the actors themselves have discretion in applying those norms 
and rules. In contrast to the rational-instrumental perspective – where influence is obtained 
through the choice of the right instruments and measures to attain predetermined goals – it is 
often the case, in institutional theory, that goals are discovered and chosen in the process. 
Whereas in rational-instrumental theories change is anticipated to come about without delay 
or hindrances, institutional theories predict historical inefficiency from the organizations’ 
established ways of working (Christensen et al., 2007). Operations have a value-infused 
character that transcends mere concerns about efficiency (Selznick, 1984).  
 
The primary goal of this thesis is to establish whether the Norwegian SAI contributes to 
securing democratic accountability. It sets about achieving this goal by assessing the impact 
of performance auditing. This study does not go so far as to scrutinize what changes the 
auditees make after having been the subject of a performance audit (Meyer and Rowan 1977); 
nor does it  consider whether potential changes can be considered improvements (Argyris, 
1999). My research is limited to exploring the auditees’ opinions about and reactions to the 
external control of the SAI.  
 
Within the institutional framework, I emphasize discourse and logics and focus on new lines 
of thinking preoccupied with both the “meaning dimension” and change (Schmidt, 2008; 
Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). I combine this with theories that are more agency-oriented and 
strategy-focused.  This is because there is a certain strategic element to the auditees’ 
responses. They do not act only in accordance to what is expected in a given situation; they 
also position themselves to safeguard their interests (Oliver, 1991).   
 
Below three different approaches are discussed: first, the institutional proposition that 
auditees will oppose change unless the SAI assessments are in harmony with their own 
opinions; second, the proposition that the arguments put forth in the performance audit reports 
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have the potential to persuade auditees to make changes; and third, the institutional-strategic 
proposition that auditees use different change-strategies contingent on the type of pressure 
they are exposed to. 
 
Institutional proposition of compatibility  
The first proposition suggests that in order to have an impact, external proposals must be 
compatible with the institution’s own opinions and perception of what is appropriate 
(Brunsson & Olsen, 1993). From this perspective, changes will be path dependent (Krasner, 
1988) and will occur only if the proposed measures are compatible with the norms and culture 
in the audited entity (Hay & Wincott, 1998). If they are not compatible, the audited entity 
could be resistant to change to some extent or other (Brunsson & Olsen, 1993; Røvik, 2007). 
 
Institutional proposition of the importance of the debate 
The second proposition attaches importance to the contribution that ideas and the debate can 
make to change. Habermas’ theory of communicative action lies at the core of this approach 
(Habermas, 1984). From this perspective, the SAI’s report is a carrier of ideas that can spur 
change within public entities. In the debate that follows the release of the report, the 
stakeholders promote the message and follow the rules of the game of their own particular 
social world. Change can come about when different social worlds collide and influence the 
way that individuals and entities reason (Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003). These social worlds 
are termed “institutional logics” (March & Olsen, 1989; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  
 
Institutional proposition of compatibility combined with a more rational, agency-oriented 
perspective 
The third proposition combines the rational-instrumental and the institutional approaches. 
Based on Oliver’s (1991) theory of strategic responses to institutional pressures, I develop a 
typology of strategic responses to performance auditing. Rational-instrumental theories on 
reactions to accountability are used instead of resource dependency theory; the former assume 
that when individuals or entities are held to account, reactions will ensue. The typology 
demonstrates how organizational behaviour may range from passive conformity to active 
resistance in response to performance auditing, depending on the extent of accountability 
pressures and on compatibility with the auditees’ own agendas. The typology incorporates 
both a logic of consequence when the audited institutions are held to account and a logic of 
appropriateness when pressures are compatible with their own norms and culture (Egeberg & 
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Saetren, 1999). The logic of consequence works through manipulated field control. The 
subordinates respond in accordance with their expectations about rewards and deprivations 
(Dahl & Lindblom, 1953).  
 
6. Methodology and research design 
In the thesis, a mixed-method research design is used. Data obtained from a questionnaire are 
triangulated with document analysis and data from interviews.  Mixed-method designs are 
required in situations where neither quantitative nor qualitative methods alone would be 
sufficient to explore the research questions (Bryman, 2006). This thesis combines methods in 
different sequencing and in different ways (Morgan, 1998).  
 
In mixed-method research, the qualitative data can contribute to an understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying the quantitative data and explain quantitative results. The quantitative 
study can be based on preliminary qualitative data collection or the data can be used for 
triangulation purposes to see if the quantitative and qualitative data converge. Other rationales 
for choosing mixed-method research can include obtaining a more comprehensive account of 
the research object and supplementing or explaining data (Bryman, 2006). These were all 
reasons for using mixed methods in this thesis. Below the methods used in the four articles 
that constitute the main part of this thesis are described. 
 
6.1 The questionnaire 
A questionnaire was developed to answer the research question about the influence of the 
SAI. I started out with the questionnaire drawn up by Professor Danielle Morin of HEC 
Montréal, who also researches the impact of performance auditing. In addition, I based my 
questionnaire on the research literature on performance auditing and my own experience as a 
performance auditor over several years (four-and-a-half years at the Office of the Auditor 
General and one-and-a-half years at the Office of the City Auditor of Oslo). 
 
When I began trying out my questionnaire on civil servants at ministries and other 
government agencies, I soon discovered that major adjustments had to be made. Together 
with my supervisor, I decided to emphasize the feedback from civil servants rather than 
sticking to the questionnaire with which I had started out. Twice I received comments from 
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advisors in the methods department of the Office of the Auditor General and once from the 
director generals in one of the performance audit departments of the Office of the Auditor 
General. I also received comments in several iterations from civil servants both at ministries 
and government agencies. 
 
The design of my questionnaire differed from that of Morin’s in that it asked questions that 
pertained to the performance audit(s) that the respondents themselves had experienced. I 
judged this to enhance the reliability and validity of the questionnaire. While I included most 
aspects of the Canadian questionnaire, I also covered others such as tasks, policy areas and 
attitudes towards the SAI. 
 
I chose to study the period 2005–2010. The goal was to identify all civil servants who had 
experienced performance auditing during that period. Going back further in time would have 
reduced the probability of  finding employees who were still at the same workplace; and even 
if they had not changed positions, it is most likely they would have found it difficult to 
remember the performance audit in detail.  
 
To find out which institutions had undergone performance auditing, I went through the 
methodology chapter of every performance audit report of the Norwegian Office of the 
Auditor General published in the given period. Eighty institutions were identified. I made a 
list of their official e-mails and/or the heads of those institutions and sent information on the 
research project, including  information about the laws of privacy, with a request for the e-mail 
workplaces themselves identified suitable people to whom to send the questionnaire may be 
seen as having contributed to the validity of the responses since the respondents were 
identified based on their involvement in the performance audits. 
 
Based on the responses from the workplaces, I established a list of e-mail addresses for all 
civil servants in the identified institutions. After sending several reminders and cleaning up 
the data, I had a total of 470 e-mail addresses. I contacted the civil servants via e-mail 
informing them about the research project and their rights under the laws of privacy. In the 
spring of 2011, I sent out the questionnaire to the 470 e-mail addresses. I received 353 
responses to my questionnaire, which represents a response rate of 74 per cent. 
 
addresses of civil servants that had been involved in the performance audits. The fact that the 
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6.2 Document analysis 
To explore both the message and the importance of the performance audit as well as the 
debate it engenders, I mapped and categorized 76 reports that the Norwegian SAI had 
followed up on during the period 2000–2011. Only reports that had been the subject of 
follow-ups were included to avoid using those that would have been too recent to have had 
any impact. This period does not match the period chosen for the questionnaire. In the 
document analysis, it was possible to include reports published before 2005 because the 
respondents’ ability to remember the performance audit was not an issue.  
 
I first identified and made a list of all 76 reports. Subsequently I mapped the questions asked, 
the conclusions reported, the organizational types audited, the administrative levels addressed,
ies’ responses and the measures taken by them.  Categories 
and their values were identified from prior research on performance auditing and customized 
for my purpose. The reports’ contents were added to a spreadsheet and subsequently imported 
into an Access database. 
 
6.3 Embedded case studies 
Reports were selected as embedded case studies to illustrate, develop and explore theories and 
concepts that would enhance understanding of accountability mechanisms and how 
accountability is related to impact (Glaser & Strauss, 1999).  
 
The above-mentioned database was used to select the case studies illustrating accountability 
mechanisms. One selection criterion was the amount of attention received from the 
parliamentary control committee and/or in the print media. Another was that some reports 
were issued when the government had a majority in the parliament and others when it had a 
minority. A final criterion was that some ministries agreed and others disagreed with the 
reports.  
 
Case studies were also used to illustrate the arguments of the various stakeholders. The debate 
that ensues from performance audits extends to discussions between interest groups, 
politicians/MPs, civil servants, academics and the general public. The deliberations can 
contribute to the influence of the SAI. Traditionally, deliberative democracy has been defined 
the audit methods used, the ministr
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as being opposed to self-interest, bargaining and negotiation, voting and the use of power. It is 
nevertheless possible to argue that limited self-interest and certain forms of negotiation can be 
part of the deliberative ideal. If the SAI’s assessment is positive, it might be persuasive and 
influence both politicians and the audited entities (Mansbridge et al., 2010). 
 
6.4 Interviews 
Interviews were conducted both with individuals and with groups of people and lasted 
approximately one hour. They were neither taped nor transcribed, but through the use of the 
touch method, I was able to document the respondents’ statements accurately and in full. 
Later the respondents approved the quotes that were used in the articles included in this thesis. 
Seven administrative executives, five senior advisors at the ministries and nine heads of the 
audited entities were interviewed to find out what influence the reports had had on their 
institutions. The ministries involved were the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the 
Environment and the Ministry of Education and Research. All had been affected by the 
performance audit reports that I had selected. Four MPs (some in government and others in 
opposition) who were members of the parliamentary control committee at the time of the 
processing of the four reports were interviewed too. 
 
The respondents were asked both general and more specific questions about the performance 
audit in which they had been involved. The interviews were anonymized. Even though the 
information is not sensitive for the person interviewed, anonymizing the data is considered to 
promote honesty in the answers and to protect the respondent from any repercussions in the 
workplace. The fact that the respondents have the possibility to express their opinions to an 
independent researcher is considered to contribute to both the reliability and the validity of the 
answers because the respondents are not risking sanctions and may be keen to give their 
opinions. 
 
My general impression from the answers that the respondents gave and the way they 





6.5. Reflections on methodology 
 
The focus of this study is the auditees’ reactions and opinions. It is thus based on research into 
“beliefs and perceptions”. It is important to take into account that its findings are based on 
perceptions and not on actual behaviour. However, opinions can and do have instrumental 
effects. Perceptions serve as frameworks for actions, rendering it more likely that certain 
behaviours are associated with certain patterns of perceptions (Egeberg & Trondal 2011, p. 
874). Research confirms that audit results are more likely to be used if the auditees consider 
them helpful (Lonsdale et al., 2011).  
 
The case study is a research tool that breaks up the dualism of positivist and more interpretive 
research (Mjøset, 2009). From this perspective, the researcher is not a passive observer of 
basic laws. The goal is to contextualize structures and contribute to explanations and 
understanding of real-life phenomena. The purpose is to generate and/or adjust concepts and 
theory or to make comparisons between the concept and the field (Glaser & Strauss, 1999).  
 
The high response rate of the survey on which this thesis is based strengthens the credibility 
of the results. There are still limits to the role a survey method can play when it comes to 
understanding meaning, mechanisms and processes. I therefore used supplementary methods 
in order to delve deeper into the underlying mechanisms and explore what the findings 
signify. 
 
7. Revisiting the research questions and findings 
The four articles that constitute the main part of this thesis are based on studies of the audit 
institution, the government administration and politicians at the national level. The research 
focus of all four articles is the control method of performance auditing.  
 
7.1. Article No. 1: Performance auditing and the importance of the debate 
This article deals with the message of the performance audit. It focuses on the discourse 
included in the Norwegian SAI’s performance audit reports and the importance of those 
reports in the public debate. It analyses the arguments put forward by the SAI, the auditees’ 
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reaction to those arguments and the ensuing public debate.  It also uses case studies to 
illustrate how the arguments of the various stakeholders differ and are based on different 
values. 
 
The SAI’s argumentation is primarily managerial and relates to the MBOR system. It is based 
on Weberian and NPM values, while the MPs swear allegiance to political convictions and 
voter values. The SAI argues for more control while the ministry argues for more leeway and 
autonomy. Both arguments are based on NPM values, but the ministries also argue for more 
discretion based on professional values. How certain arguments resonate more with MPs and 
how MPs reactions’ can induce changes in the audited entities is also discussed in this article.  
 
What the SAI evaluates is, in fact, an empirical question. The content of the performance 
audit triggers reactions and measures taken by the audited entities. Evaluation researchers 
have the same interest vis-à-vis different types of evaluation. The message of the performance 
audit influences what type of criticism the SAI exposes itself to. If the SAI assumes the role 
of “public accountant” – that is, one oriented towards, above all,  evaluating compliance with 
systems and processes – it risks being accused of  having too narrow  a focus (see the chapter 
titled “Performance audit”, which focuses on auditor roles). Several researchers have voiced 
this concern (Leeuw, 1996; Morin, 2008; Power, 1997; Radcliffe, 2011; Van Thiel & Leeuw, 
2002). If the SAI is results-oriented – that is, it assumes the role of “management consultant” 
or “researcher” – it risks being accused of having a political agenda. Other researchers have 
discussed this dilemma (Guthrie & Parker, 1999; Jacobs, 1998; Radcliffe, 1998).  
 
Article No. 1 demonstrates that the role played by the SAI can be hard to classify. Even 
though it appears to play the role of “management consultant” (Pollitt et al., 1999), it may 
conduct an audit focused on compliance with management standards. At the same time, the 
roles of “management consultant” and “researcher” may conflict with the auditor’s mandate 
of being independent and concerned with accountability. This means that these auditor roles 
can be hard to apply in practice. Thus this article argues for the need of a fifth auditor role – 
namely, of “management accountant” – in order to better describe the content of the 




7.2. Article No. 2: Political accountability and performance auditing: The case 
of the Norwegian auditor general  
Article No. 2 focuses on civil servants who have been audited by the SAI and aims to 
establish how performance auditing affects them. It explores both if and when performance 
audit reports are perceived by the auditees as helpful and when reports are used for 
accountability purposes.  
 
A majority of respondents finds performance auditing helpful. If auditees agreed with the 
audit criteria and assessments, had an influence on the process, viewed the reports favourably 
and believed the SAI contributed to accountability and improvement, they were more likely to 
regard the report as useful. This contradicts Power’s assertion that audit produces only 
reassurance and has no real effect (Power, 1997). At the same time, it supports recent 
qualitative research arguing that for the SAI to have an impact, importance must be attached 
to communication and reaching an understanding with auditees on the audit criteria and 
assessments (Alwardat, 2010; Put, 2011; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2011; 
Vanlandingham, 2011).  
 
Approximately one-third of the respondents said that the performance audit was used to hold 
the minister to account. The administrative level of the auditees, the use of the report to 
further interests, the attention received from politicians, the media and the parliament all 
contribute to the increased likelihood of reports being used to hold to account. 
 
Article No. 2 evaluates the SAI’s work based on the opinions of those affected by it. This 
is a valid research method because one of the main purposes of the performance audit is to 
contribute to improvement in the audited entities. The auditees’ reactions to the reports are 
therefore important. How they perceive and use the reports will influence whether 




7.3. Article No. 3: Auditee strategies: An investigation into the auditees’ 
reactions to the performance audits of the Norwegian Supreme Audit 
Institution 
In Article No. 3, the mechanisms underlying the auditees’ responses to performance auditing 
are explored and classified. Four categories of response are identified based on two 
dimensions:  the extent of sanctions against the auditees and the degree to which the values of 
the auditors conflict with those of the auditees. The typology is based on Oliver’s institutional 
theory, which uses resource dependency theory to add strategic concerns to institutional 
theory (Oliver, 1991). According to her theory, institutions are more inclined to make changes 
if they are dependent on the external organization pressuring them. In the typology of 
responses to performance auditing, the “dependency dimension” is replaced with the 
“accountability dimension”. The government administration has only an administrative 
relationship with and is not dependent on the SAI. However, parliament can apply sanctions 
based on the SAI’s assessments. In individual cases, the auditees’ reactions will depend not 
only on complex and situational factors but also on the sanctions that are applied.  
 
The typology is based on both institutional theory, which argues that the external pressure 
must be compatible with internal values in order to be effective (Brunsson & Olsen, 1993), 
and rational-instrumental arguments based on the pre-emptive effect of accountability 
(Furubo, 2011). The four types in the typology are: capitulating, defying, copying and 
ignoring. When auditees capitulate, there is value conflict but important sanctions are 
imposed. When they defy the SAI’s assessments, there is value conflict but sanctions are 
absent or less important. When they copy, there is no value conflict but important sanctions 
are still imposed. The last type signifies a situation in which there is no value conflict and 
sanctions are absent or less important. Contrary to expectations, the SAI’s report had a major 
influence even when there was no debate.  This indicates that there must be a dimension 
missing in the theory – and that dimension could be the materiality of the findings. 
 
7.4. Article No. 4: Resistance to control: The reactions of Norwegian 
ministries and government agencies to performance auditing 
Article No. 4 explores how various characteristics of civil servants determine how they 




The analysis shows that civil servants at ministries tend to be less positive about performance 
auditing than civil servants at government agencies. This can be explained by their respective 
positions in the structural hierarchy. Ministries and agencies have different interests and tasks. 
The former are the ones formally held to account in a performance audit. Their main role is to 
protect and assist the minister in the development and implementation of policies. They will, 
therefore, be more sensitive to criticism. At the same time, their ability to remedy weaknesses 
is limited, as the tasks are most often conducted by separate or semi-affiliated public agencies. 
As regards government agencies, the attention that the performance audit report receives may 
enhance their chances of receiving more attention and hence more resources for their policy 
area.  This may explain why these entities are less critical. Their responses are rationally 
bounded by their position within the organization (Selznick, 1984).   
 
Top executives, irrespective of their administrative level, are more negative about the reports 
than middle managers and other public employees. Nonetheless, they, along with civil 
servants at the ministries, are the ones who must take the blame on behalf of the audited entity 
and potentially face the consequences. They are also the ones responsible for establishing 
priorities.  For its part, the SAI increasingly probes the efficiency and effectiveness of 
operations and eventually closes in on the question of priorities and politics, which makes 
ministries and top executives uncomfortable. 
 
Furthermore, civil servants more exposed to performance auditing were, in general, more 
negative towards it. This could be a reaction to control overload, but it could also demonstrate 
discomfort with legitimate criticism.  
 
8. Implications for democratic accountability 
Ideally, performance auditing will ensure democratic accountability by safeguarding the 
efficient and effective use of public funds. Michael Power, for his part, advanced the 
provocative hypothesis that auditing contributes only to reassurance. For this reason, he   
encouraged researchers to examine the real impact of audits (Power, 1997). Contrary to 
Power’s assertion, I found that in in Norway, performance auditing is not only perceived as 
helpful; it is also considered to be used to hold ministers to account. The Norwegian 
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nisters democratically accountable for their 
use of the taxpayer’s money (see Figure 1 above). Below the four sets of research questions 
posed initially are discussed. 
 
The first set of questions focused on what the auditees were held to account for. The findings 
of this thesis suggest that auditees are held accountable primarily for their implementation of 
the state control system (MBOR). In the SAI’s assessments, norms from NPM logic were 
used more extensively than norms based on the Weberian logic of the professional 
bureaucracy. It is unclear if the SAI played the role of “researcher” and/or “management 
consultant” or whether the use of managerial norms in its reports indicates that the SAI 
assesses, above all, compliance with managerial standards (Pollitt et al., 1999).  
 
The first set of research questions also examined the importance of the performance audit in 
the public debate. Document analysis confirmed that the parliamentary control committee and 
the media are interested in only a small number of reports. They paid moderate attention only 
to most performance audits. Accountability pressures are mobilized only when there is a 
certain interest in the reports. Therefore it is primarily through direct dialogue and through the 
arguments in its reports that the SAI exercises influence over the public administration.  
 
The first set of research questions also raised the issue of the implications of public debates 
for the SAI’s influence. The debates in the parliamentary control committee and the media as 
well as the discourse between the SAI and the ministries revealed that the ministries do not 
necessarily accept the premises for the SAI’s criticism. In one example, the ministries’ 
interpretation of the MBOR system differed from that of the SAI.  The interviewed civil 
servants openly admitted that they had disagreed with the SAI’s assessments and that they 
therefore had not made any changes.  They had been in favour of increased autonomy, 
whereas the SAI had maintained that more control was needed. This conflict mirrors the 
public-management dilemma of confidence in versus control over the professions, which is 
discussed by several scholars (Ferlie & Geraghty, 2005). Since the 1980s there has been an 
increasing tendency to delegate tasks from ministries to government agencies and other 
subordinate entities. In the 1990s several reforms were implemented in Norway to allow both 
more autonomy and more extensive external control (Lægreid et al., 2006). This system 
renders accountability relations more ambiguous and paves the way for different emphases on 
SAI therefore plays a role in holding mi
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the need for control and autonomy. Differences in values and opinions pertaining to those 
questions can restrict the SAI’s influence.  
 
The second set of research questions focused on the extent to which performance audits are 
perceived as helpful by the auditees, the extent to which they are used to hold ministers to 
account and how the observed patterns can be explained. The analysis demonstrated that a 
majority of auditees found the SAI’s performance audit reports helpful. Their perception of 
usefulness was contingent on the perceived quality of the report, how the auditees viewed the 
SAI as an institution, their experience of improvements and the degree to which their 
comments were taken into account. The perception of usefulness may lead to operational 
improvements if the performance audit and the report are used for learning purposes (Argyris, 
1999; De Vries et al., 2000). Perceptions are key for actions being taken. If the SAI’s 
assessments are persuasive and the process inclusive, it is likely that improvements will be 
forthcoming both in the short and the long term. 
 
The analysis of the questionnaire revealed that approximately one-third of auditees believed 
that performance audits are used to hold ministers to account. Both hierarchical and social 
accountability mechanisms were at play here. Civil servants at ministries were most aware of 
the accountability dimension. The minister was more likely to be held accountable if media or 
other external actors were interested in the report, if the minister came under pressure from 
political opponents or if the parliamentary control committee asked for measures to be taken.  
 
The third set of research questions were aimed at determining which mechanisms are 
triggered in the audited entities when the SAI holds them to account. The auditees use various 
strategies to respond to the SAI’s performance audits. The influence of the SAI is enhanced 
when its conclusions and methods of communication are compatible with the auditees’ 
interests and values. If the auditees disagree with the auditor’s findings, the SAI must 
convince both the control committee and the parliament to apply sanctions and force the 
auditees to comply. If the auditees consider the findings important, extensive improvements 
may be used even if sanctions are absent. The case studies showed that the SAI can influence 
auditees when the control committee is mobilized. This demonstrates that persuasion through 




The fourth set of research questions examined how audited civil servants, both at ministries 
and government agencies, view the SAI’s performance audit reports. Civil servants in the 
ministries, who are the primary target audience for the reports, are substantially more 
sceptical towards the reports than are the civil servants in agencies. This may hamper the 
SAI’s influence. Whether civil servants are top executives, middle managers or bureaucrats 
without leadership responsibilities also matters for their perception of the quality of the 
reports. The top executives were the most sceptical towards the reports. This demonstrates 
that it is the accountable parties who have the most negative attitude in this respect. It is likely 
that the SAI’s influence would be increased if these actors were more positive. Thus, in order 
to enhance its influence, the SAI would be advised to customize its reports to their liking. The 
question, however, is whether this would compromise the independent role and legitimacy of 
the SAI.  
 
The more performance audits the auditees had experienced, the more sceptical they were 
towards the audit reports.  This could suggest control overload or discomfort caused by 
legitimate criticism of mismanagement. In the case of mismanagement, auditees would 
disagree with the SAI’s assessments. It would therefore be necessary to hold them to account 
and sanction them in order for changes to be made. Moreover, attention from the 
parliamentary control committee and the media would contribute to bringing about changes. 
 
The theoretical contributions of this thesis 
By linking the action-oriented concept of auditor roles to values and institutional logics that 
can further or hinder communication, I contribute to the understanding of change in 
institutional theory. Potential change is mediated, above all, through dialogue and debate. 
 
I also extend the typology of auditor roles to include the “management accountant” role, 
which better describes the auditor’s tendency to check the auditee’s compliance with 
management systems and standards.  
 
In addition, I contribute to institutional theory by adapting Oliver’s theory on responses to 
institutional pressures to performance auditing (Oliver, 1991). By replacing the degree of the 
institutions’ resource dependency with the degree of sanctioning by the parliamentary control 
committee, I construct a new typology. Based on two explanatory dimensions, the typology 




The empirical contributions of this thesis 
My research contributes towards closing a gap in the research on the impact of performance 
auditing. To date there has been little research on establishing the influence of SAIs 
(Lonsdale, 1999; Lonsdale et al., 2011). In her 2008 article, Morin uses factor analysis and 
establishes factors of importance for the SAI’s influence. Factors with a certain mean score 
were judged to have impact. Her subsequent work has been based on participant observation 
at France’s Cour des Comptes (Morin, 2010, 2011).  
 
Like Morin, I base my assessments on the opinions of the auditees.  But besides identifying 
factors, I examine how those factors matter for the auditees’ tendency to perceive 
performance auditing as helpful. I also examine what the auditees’ perception of the 
performance audits are contingent upon and demonstrate that it is, above all, the auditees’ 
interests and positions in the structural hierarchy. In addition to assessing the SAI’s “soft” 
influence, through persuasion, I investigate when and why the reports are used to hold 
ministers to account. I also assess the importance of the reports for the public debate.  Thus 
my research is more explanatory and provides a better understanding of the mechanisms of 
the SAI’s influence than does earlier research. I also have a broader methodological and 
empirical base for my conclusions as I have both mapped and categorized performance audit 
reports as well as analysed data from a questionnaire and conducted interviews. This has 
allowed me to understand the more subtle ways that auditors exercise influence in an 
approach that takes stock both of strategic considerations and different interpretations 
mediated through debate.  
 
Power (1997, p. xvii) speculates whether performance auditing encourages individuals to 
game the system and public managers to make significant efforts to cope with the pressures 
that auditing brings to bear. Other literature on performance auditing demonstrates that the 
more such auditing is geared towards measuring outcome, the more the audit institutions are 
accused of being political and interfering with the ministries’ priorities (Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2006). My research demonstrates that some of the SAI’s conclusions can trigger 
considerable resistance. If the ministries disagree with the assessments of the report, the audit 
is unlikely to have the expected impact, unless the parliamentary control committee applies 




In addition to contributing to research on the impact of the performance audit, my thesis 
contributes to the literature on content of the performance audit. It has demonstrated that the 
Norwegian SAI’s assessments and arguments are more concerned with the control system 
(MBOR) than with compliance and that the SAI harbours ambitions to evaluate results as 
well. Norwegian performance audit reports are broad-based, containing several different types 
of both audit question and conclusion. This means it is hard to classify them as belonging to 
one type of report or the other. Research even more focused on the content of the SAI’s 
argumentation is needed to probe further into what the SAI’s message is and how 
performance auditing  can have an impact. Other questions to explore in future research 
include: how and why is performance auditing useful; whether its  use is of a tactical, political 
or other nature (Weiss, 1979); the extent to which auditees make changes during, rather than 
after, the performance auditing  process ;and what types of change are made. Two more 
important questions are whether performance auditing leads to concrete changes and 
improvements and if potential changes can be characterized as single-loop or double-loop 
learning (Argyris, 1999).   
 
In the literature on performance auditing, there is a general interest in how audit institutions 
themselves work – in particular, how auditors choose the subjects of their audits and how they 
make assessments. Another interesting question is what the audit institutions do to prevent 
corruption. As the subject of my thesis is democratic control and accountability, I have 
focused on reactions to the SAI’s performance audit reports. I have not examined the question 
of how the audit institution itself works. This might nevertheless be an interesting topic to 
explore in future research, including the risks and materiality underlying the auditor’s choice 
of subjects to audit and strategies. And it would be equally interesting to scrutinize how the 
SAI is affected by social accountability mechanisms and external institutional pressure. 
 
The SAI is supposed to monitor the proper use of the tax-payer’s money. Its legitimacy rests 
on its ability to identify and deal with the deficiencies in   public administration. In the 
process of choosing subjects to audit, it uses risk analysis. Those projects that pose the 
greatest risk are chosen for the ensuing performance audits. Because of the system and the 
audit institution’s need for legitimacy, auditors could be tempted to produce critical reports, 
while auditees often argue for a more balanced presentation of the findings (Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2006). An alternative strategy for the SAI could be to assume the role of 
“researcher” and devote more space in its reports to debating its findings rather than making 
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judgments. However, such a strategy could expose the SAI to the risk of its role being 
questioned owing to unclear assessments.  This, in turn, could result in calls for outsourcing 
some of its tasks to research institutes. But the role played by the SAI is, in any case, already 
being questioned. The following three-pronged strategy could therefore provide a solution to 
challenges it faces: assuming the role of “researcher” to address questions of societal 
outcome, the role of “management consultant” to address issues of organizational 
improvement and the role of “investigator” to address issues of mismanagement and 
corruption. Research on this subject could address the relationship between the SAI’s impact, 
on the one hand, and its internal organization and the design of its report, on the other. 
 
The effect of the SAI’s assessments differs from sector to sector. To understand the full 
influence exercised by the SAI, the pre-emptive impact of its continued monitoring of 
auditees should be further explored. Such an investigation could focus on the SAI’s follow-up 
activities and the effect of several investigations conducted at regular intervals over a period 
of time in various policy areas.  
 
In future research, it would also be of theoretical interest to examine what kind of debates are 
triggered by performance auditing and explore the mechanisms of the impact of these debates, 
which is linked to horizontal accountability mechanisms and the conceptual effect. 
 
Audit institutions’ practices vary from country to country and from culture to culture as well 
as in terms of organizational set-up, including mandates, resources and work culture.  Both 
locally and internationally, it would therefore enhance the understanding of the practice of 






Attachment 1: Questionnaire 
 
The influence of performance auditing 
_____________________________________________________________ 
The questions pertain to the performance audits conducted by the Office of the 
Auditor General (OAG). It will take approximately 15 minutes to fill out this 
survey. You can navigate back and forth with the buttons at the bottom of the 
page or in your web browser  
 
If you have any questions, you can contact me on e-mail: kristin.reichborn-
kjennerud@aorg.uib.no; or on my mobile phone: 92680108. 
 
Use the whole scale (1-5) when you fill out this survey. If there are questions that 
are too hard to answer, choose the "Don't know" option and move onto the next 
question.  
 
Your identity will be hidden. 
  





Guidance for the questions below: By "top executive", we mean the most senior 
administrative leader at your place of work. By "middle manager", we mean other 
administrative leaders with HR responsibilities. "Civil servant" refers to the rest of 
the employees. 
 
1) What is your current position?  
 
 Top executive 
 Middle manager 
 Civil servant 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2) At what administrative level are you?  
 
 Ministry  
 Directorate or other type of agency on the same level as directorate  
 Regional or local office  
 State -owned corporation 
 County or municipality  







3) What is your academic background?  
 Law (Law degree/Master's degree)  
 Economy (Master's degree)  
 Master of Business Administration  
 Historical-philosophical subjects (Master's degree)  
 Civil agronomist examination  
 Political science (Master's degree)  
 Other social sciences (Master's degree)  
 Mathematics and natural sciences, civil engineering, architecture 
(Master's degree)  
 Medicine (doctor, dentist, veterinary surgeon) (Master's degree) 
 Higher military education 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 PhD 











6) Are you male or female?  
 
 Male  
 Female  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
7) Within which policy/ministry area are you working?  
 
 General public services 
 Defence  
 Public order and safety  
 Economic affairs  
 Environmental protection  
 Housing and community amenities  
 Health  
  Recreation, culture and religion  
  Education  




8) What is the main focus of your work?  
 
 Human relations  
 Organizational development  
 Preparing and making changes to laws and 
regulations 
 Drawing up agreements and conventions 
  Budgeting  
 Other analysis, reporting and planning  
 Decision-making in case handling pertaining to 
individuals, businesses, institutions and so forth  
 Auditing, regulation and supervision  
 Coordination  
 Information and public relations  











10) How many performance audits have you experienced?  
 




















11) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statements below 
about the OAG? (1= disagree completely, 5 = agree completely)  
 
1 2 3 4          5  
The performance audits of the OAG 
contribute to improvements in the 
audited entities 
 
The OAG is an important institution 
that promotes transparency and 
prevents fraud 
 
The OAG has an important symbolic 
function as a tool of control for the 
parliament but is not so important in 
practice  
Rather than contributing to 
improvements, the OAG worsens working 
conditions in the audited entities 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
When you answer the following questions, you can relate them to one of the 
performance audits that you have experienced. If you have been involved in 
several performance audits, please choose the last performance audit in which 
you were involved. You can base your answers on this last (published) 
performance audit report. 
 
12) Name the performance audit you were involved in (give the full title of 





If you cannot find the report in the box above, if you cannot remember the title 
of the report or if you prefer to base your answer on your experience of several 
performance audits, answer the following question. 
 











14) In what ways were you involved in this/these performance audit(s)? 
(several options allowed) 
 
 I was the contact person 
 I wrote/contributed to writing the ministry's answer to the performance audit 
report  
 I checked the facts in the report 
 I contributed to finding relevant information  
 I was interviewed by the auditors 
 I read the report 





15) If there are questions that you cannot answer when you proceed with 
the questionnaire, please continue to the next page. Answer the questions 




Questions about the performance audit(s) 
 
Performance audits focus on compliance with laws, procedures, standards and 
quality assurance systems (as do inspection reports) or on activities, goal 
attainment and results (as do research reports). Performance audits provide 
explanations to varying degrees. 
 
16) In your opinion, was the performance audit primarily oriented 










17) What type of non-compliance with audit criteria did the performance 
audit primarily report? (1= the most important, 2= the second-most 
important, 3= the third-most important) 
 
 
 1st  drop-down list 
 2nd  drop-down list 





18) To what extent did the performance audit report provide explanations 
about non-compliance with audit criteria? (1= to a very small extent, 5= to a 























The audited entities have the possibility to comment on the following aspects of 
the performance audit: the audit questions, the audit criteria, the interviews 
conducted, the audit evidence and the results. Below we ask if you feel that your 
feedback was sufficiently taken into account by the OAG 
 
19) In your dialogue with the OAG, to what extent were your comments 
taken into account? (1= to a very small extent, 5 = to a very large extent) 
 
1 2 3 4 5  Don’t  
     know 
           
              
Our comments about our risk 
assessment were sufficiently 
taken into account 
 
Our comments about the audit 
questions were sufficiently taken into 
account 
 
Our comments about the audit 
criteria were sufficiently taken into 
account 
 
Our comments about the meeting 
minutes from interviews were 
sufficiently taken into account 
 
Our comments made during 
contact meetings were 
sufficiently taken into account 
 
Our comments about the audit 
evidence (factual basis) were 
sufficiently taken into account 
 
Our comments about the OAG's 
interpretation of the audit evidence 
were sufficiently taken into account 
 
Our comments regarding the OAG’s 






20) How did you, all in all, experience the dialogue with the performance audit 


















21) To what extent did you agree or disagree with the audit criteria and the 






























































22) To what extent do you agree with the statements below about the 
performance audit reports? (1= to a very small extent, 5= to a very large 
extent) 
 
    Don’t 
1     2      3      4      5 know 
 
The methods used in the performance 
audit adopted scientific/good 
standards 
 
The performance audit report was of a  
high quality 
 
The performance audit report dealt 
with some of our more important 
policy areas 
 
The performance audit report 
showed that the auditors have 
zero tolerance for deviance from 
the objectives that have been set 
 
Most of the conclusions in the 
performance audit report were 
sufficiently concrete 
 
The performance audit report took 
sufficiently into account the fact that 
we have to meet several conflicting 
objectives 
 
The performance audit report 
recommended additional controls 
without considering whether the 
increase in costs would pay off in 
terms of reduced risk   
  
 
The performance audit report was 
an important source of information 
for me in my work 
 
The conclusions in the performance 
audit report appeared oversimplified 
in that they failed to distinguish 
between more and less important 
audit evidence 
 
The performance audit report 
proved that the auditors had good 
sector expertise 
 
Owing to its focus on deviance, the 
OAG always finds something to 
criticize 
 
The link between audit criteria, facts 
and assessments in the performance 










Based on its performance audit, the OAG writes a report that is sent to the 
ministries for comments before it is sent to the parliamentary committees. 
 
23) To what extent did you agree overall with the OAG’s conclusions in the 







 Don’t know 
 
 
24) To what extent did the audited entity make changes as a consequence of the 
assessments in the performance audit report? (1= to a very small extent, 5= to a 













25) What changes have there been at your place of work since the 
performance audit? (You can choose several options.) 
 
 Changes in laws and regulations 
 Changes in significant procedures pinpointed by the OAG 
 Changes in strategies, planning and/or the management by objectives and results 
system 
 Changes in internal control and risk management 
 Higher economic priority in the audited policy area 
 Changes in procedures of coordination 
 Changes in management or organization 
 Changes in the training of staff 
 Increased documentation and reporting 
 Changes in personnel 
 Lay-offs and changes of workplace 















26) To what extent did you view these changes as improvements? (1= to a very 
small  extent,  5= to a very large extent). Choose only the options that are 
relevant for you. 
 
 Changes in laws and regulations 
 Changes in significant procedures pinpointed by the OAG 
 Changes in  strategies, planning and/or the management by objectives and 
results system 
 Changes in internal control and risk management 
 Higher economic priority in the audited policy area 
 Changes in procedures for coordination 
 Changes in management or organization 
 Changes in the training of staff 
 Increased documentation and reporting 
 Changes in personnel 
 Lay-offs and changes of workplace 





27) To what extent do you think the following might have contributed to 
changes in the audited entity? (1= to a very small extent, 5= to a very large 
extent) 
 
    Not  
1      2      3     4      5 applicable 
 
The employees wished to make 
changes based on the performance 
audit report 
 
The media or other external parties 
showed great interest in the 
performance audit report 
 
The conclusions in the performance 
audit report corresponded to the 
audited entity's own perception; 
the recommended changes would 
therefore have been implemented 
anyway 
 
Management tends to give 
priority to the performance 
audits of the OAG 
 
The Standing Committee on Scrutiny 
and Constitutional Affairs demanded 
that the government administration 
introduce new measures to improve 
the situation in response to the 
performance audit report 
 
The political leadership signalled 
measures to deal with the 
weaknesses addressed in the 








28) If you didn’t make any changes, why not? 
 
 We didn't have the possibility to make all these changes as other levels of 
public administration were responsible 
 We didn’t think that the facts in the report were presented accurately 
 We didn’t agree with the assessments of the OAG 
 We weren't responsible for making the changes 
 It was too early make changes 






Consequences of performance auditing 
 
29) To what extent do you agree or disagree that the performance audit has led 
to the following (intended or unintended) consequences? (1= disagree 
completely,5= agree completely) 
 
     Don’t 
1      2      3      4      5 know 
 
The performance audit has been 
used to further various actors’ 
interests 
 
More controls and thereby more 
work were a consequence of the 
performance audit 
 
In relations with partners, the media, 
customers and clients, we notice that 
the reputation of our workplace has 
deteriorated 
 
We have seen an increase in 
costs and the use of resources 
since the performance audit 
 
The performance audit has 
increased interest in learning from 
best practice 
 
Policy areas that did not receive 
much attention before have been 
given priority since the 
performance audit 
 
We have made changes to 
systems that previously did 
not work very well 
 
It is harder for management to 
prioritize as the performance audit 
has set the agenda 
 
The OAG’s use of government 
financial regulations in the audit 
criteria led to too tight control 
 
The performance audit did not lead 
to changes, even though they 







30) If the OAG has followed up the performance audit report, to what extent 






 4  
 5 





Performance auditing and the media 
 
31) To what extent did the media show an interest in the performance 













32) To what extent did the following happen as a consequence of the media 
interest? (1= to a very small extent, 5= to a very large extent) 
 
    Not 
1     2      3      4      5 applicable 
 
The audited entity became overly 
prudent in their management 
practices because of the facts 
reported in the media 
 
The reputation of the audited entity was  
affected 
 
A political debate was launched 
 
The minister and/or the 
administration came under pressure 
from political opponents 
 











The purpose of supervision can be to hold members of the government 
responsible for errors and deficiencies (accountability monitoring) or it can 
aim to improve the government administration (management monitoring). 
 
33) To what extent (1= to a very small extent, 5 = to a very large extent) 
did you find that the performance audit:  
 
     Don’t 
1      2      3      4      5 know 
 
Was used to hold the minister 
accountable for their actions 
(accountability monitoring) 
 
 Was used to improve the operations 







34) To what extent do you think those responsible have taken corrective 













35) To what extent did you find the performance audit useful? (1= to a very 
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Attachment  2:  Document analysis 
The report 




Period of the follow-up of the report 
 
Press release 
The ministry the report is 
addressed to  
(ministries’ tasks are often 
reorganized when a new 
government enters office, 
therefore there are 
overlapping tasks and 
names) 
Ministry of Government Administration and Reform  
 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
 
Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development 
 
Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion 
 
Ministry of the Environment 
 
Ministry of Finance 
 
Ministry of Trade and Industry 
 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
 
Ministry of Transport and Communications 
 
Ministry of Defence 
 
Ministry of Children and Equality 
 
Ministry of Justice and the Police 
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
 
Ministry of Education  
 
Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs 
 
Ministry of Agriculture 
 
Ministry of Justice 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Ministry of Health and Care Services 
 
Ministry of Education and Research 
 




Ministry of Fisheries 
 
Ministry of Reform 
 
Ministry of Children and the Family 
 
Ministry of Health and Social Inclusion 
 
Ministry of Education, Research and Church Affairs 




Government agency or equivalent 
 
Local or regional state office 
 
State corporations or health enterprises 
 
County or municipality 
 
Foundation 
Type of assessment in the 
report 
Deficiencies in the design of goals and key performance indicators  
 
Deficiencies in goal attainment and control 
 




Non-compliance with  laws, standards and procedures 
 
Deficient or irrelevant management information 
 




Not informing sufficiently well  
 




Lack of competence 










Audit questions in the 
report 
On compliance (with laws, rules, standards or quality assurance 
systems) 
 
On activities within the audited entity  
 
On results achieved (according to stated goals) 
 
On explaining problems 
 
On the ministry’s guidance  
 
























Agree with certain reservations 
 
Disagree with the premise of criticism 
 
Disagree 
The Ministry’s stance  on 
implementing measures  
Will implement measures 
 
Measures had already been implemented before the report 
 
Will not implement measures 
 
Newspapers that referred 





























The review of the report 
by the parliamentary 





The name and number of the committee’s recommendation 
 
The number of remarks in the recommendation 
 
The number of pages with remarks in the recommendation 
 
Whether the members of the opposition were in the majority in the 
committee 
 
Whether a public hearing was called for 
The  review of the report 
by the parliament 
The number of comments about the report in the parliament 
 




Attachment 3: Interview guides 
 
Interview guide for MPs. The reports and the debates  
 
1. What did you think about the reports? 
2. What did you think about the debate in the parliamentary control committee? 
3. What did you think about the debate in the media? 
4. How did the debate in the media influence the control committee? 
5. Or was there no debate and, in which case, why not?  
6. Do you perceive performance auditing as important? Why?  Can you give examples? 
 
The use of the reports  
 
7. How did you use the performance audit report? 
8. Did MPs use the reports? How?  
9. How did politicians from other parties use the report?  
10. Did other actors, such as interest groups, contact you about topics that the Supreme 
Audit Institution addressed in its performance audits?  




12. Did you experience “blame games” or other such things after the publication of the 
performance audit reports? 
13. How did you respond to that? 
14. How did you work to influence the public administration in the control committee and 
in Parliament? 
15. What was the result? 
16. The law was changed in 2004–2005 to allow the parliament to question the heads of 
agencies as well as the heads of ministries. A minority in the control committee can 
call hearings of representatives? What do you consider the positive and negative 
aspects of this change? 




18. What was the result when the audited entities were held to account? Give examples.  
 
General questions about the State Audit Institution 
 
19. What kind of information provided by the SAI do you consider most interesting? 
20. As a politician, what are you looking for specifically in the reports? 
21. For what purpose do you think your opponents are using the reports? 
22. Are there differences in how the opposition and the ruling party relate to the SAI’s 
performance audit reports?  
23. How is it important for the SAIs influence if/when the SAI issue several reports on the 
same topic or sector? 
24. Is it primarily the one single report or a series of reports on the same sector that trigger 
changes in the audited entities? 
25. What is preferred? Performance audit reports focused on the internal activities of the 
audited entity, on control systems, on compliance and/or on results and outcomes? 
26. Why? 
27. What are the challenges presented by the different types of report? 
28. Can you mention one positive and one negative aspect of the SAI’s role? 
29. In what way does the SAI have influence? What mechanisms do the publication of a 
performance audit report trigger and what is the result? 
30. Do you think that performance auditing leads to improvements in the audited entities 
to those aspects criticized by the SAI? 
31. What is your view on the role of the SAI in the past compared with its role today? 
32. Do you consider the SAI to have a political agenda?  
33. How should the SAI relate to the control committee and the parliament? 
34. Do you have good and bad examples of the way it relates to these two entities? 
35. What is the SAI’s most important task in your opinion? 
36. What is the best way to handle these tasks? 
37. What should the SAI not do? 
38. Is it important to hold civil servants to account and why? 
39. Who should be held to account and when? 
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40. To what extent does the SAI succeed in doing that? 
41. What happens after the publication of a performance audit report? What is the best 
strategy for the ministry to use? 
42. Do you learn from the SAI’s reports? What characterizes this learning process? 
43. How is decision-making influenced? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The interview guides used for ministries and for agencies differed slightly, but as most of the 
questions were similar, they have been merged into one here (see immediately below).  
 
Interview guide for ministries/agencies 
 
I have questions about the X performance audit report by the SAI and changes that followed 
at X as a consequence of the report. 
 
X is reported to have happened in the report. The SAI has followed up on the report after X 
years. They report the following: X. 
 
Opinions about the report 
 
1. What does the ministry/agency think about the report? Does the ministry/agency have 
a positive or negative attitude towards it? 
2. How does the ministry/agency feel about the fact that X is held to account for X? 
3. Does the ministry/agency feel that it has sufficient instruments and means to deal with 
the situation?  




5. What was the ministry/agency’s position in the debate ensuing the publication of the 
report? 
 
6. What did the ministry/agency think about the debate in the parliament and in the 
media?  
 
7. Did the reactions and the debate in the media influence how the ministry/agency dealt 
with the situation? 
 
8. Did politicians’ initiatives influence how the ministry/agency dealt with the situation? 
 




10. What did it lead to? 
 
11. Did interest groups or other stakeholders interfere? 
 
12. How did this happen? 
 
 
The relationship to the agency 
 
13. Except for managing the performance and results system, does the ministry have other 
informal channels through which it was informed about the agency’s operations? 
 
14. How do the ministry and the agency cooperate over responding to the SAI’s 
performance audit report? 
 
15. How does the ministry monitor and evaluate the implemented changes in the agency?  
 
Strategies, learning and perceptions 
 
16. How did the ministry/agency use the report? 
17. What did the ministry/agency learn from the report? Did it provide new information, 
new ideas or new solutions? 
18. What conditions should be present for an optimal learning outcome of the 
performance audit? 
19. What persuaded the ministry/agency to respond to the SAI’s criticism?  
20. When did the ministry/agency simply pretend to respond?   
21. What did the ministry/agency choose not to pursue and why? 
22. How and to what extent does the ministry/agency have discretion in the follow-up (or 
not) to the SAI’s criticism? 
23. Does it help to argue against the SAI? When and how? 
24. What can the ministry/agency obtain through different strategies? 
25. How did the ministry/agency’s perception of the report influence the way the report 
was handled and what changes did it trigger?  
26. The SAI often follows up a performance audit with a financial audit. Does this have 
real impact?  
27. The SAI sometimes publishes several reports on similar topics in the same sector. 
What is the impact of this cumulative attention?  
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28. What is more effective in influencing the ministry/agency to enact changes: one report 
or a series of reports together with the SAI’s follow-up? 
 
Consequences of the report 
 
29. What was the primary trigger for the changes that the ministry/agency ended up 
implementing (the audit report, the entity’s own plans, political pressure, media 
interest)? 
30. What results did the ministry/agency expect from the changes? 
31. How did the ministry/agency ensure results? How did it follow up on the measures 
implemented? 
32. Did any of the changes have negative effects for operations or results (for example 
goal displacement, change of priorities, more bureaucracy, less flexibility, reputational 
damage)? 
 
33. Did any of the changes have positive consequences for operations or results? 
34. How did the SAI’s follow-up influence the ministry/agency? 
35. Did the performance audit report lead to better results in any areas? Why or why not?  
36. What does the ministry/agency prefer? Reports focused on internal activities, systems, 
compliance or societal outcomes? 
37.  Why? 
38. What may be problematic with each of the different types of report? 
39. Can the ministry/agency give examples of performance audit results  
  
General questions about the SAI 
 
40. What is the SAI’s most important task? 
41. How should the SAI handle its tasks? 
42. How should the SAI not handle its tasks? 
43. Is it important to hold civil servants to account and why? 
44. Who in the public administration should be held to account and when? 
45. How does the SAI succeed in doing this? 
46. What happens after the publication of a performance audit report and what is the best 
way for the ministry/agency to respond? 
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47. Did the ministry/agency learn from the SAI’s performance audit reports?  
48. How does this learning process work?  
49. And how does it influence decisions? 
50. What importance do the SAI’s reports have for the decisions taken by the 
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